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ABSTRACT
Ryou, Ji Woo. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2014. Effect of Product
Market Competition on Financial Reporting Quality. Major Professor: Hyun Hong, Ph.D.
and Zabihollah Rezaee, Ph.D.
Product markets are becoming increasingly more competitive. Because of an
increased number of firms in U.S. product market, globalization, and FTA (Free Trade
Agreement), both product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals
is growing. This dissertation examines the effect of growing product market competition
on financial reporting quality.
The first dissertation paper examines product market competition from potential
entrants and existing rivals on earnings quality. Theory suggests that firms in intense
competition may engage in real earnings management or accrual based earnings
management. However, the differential direction of the effect of each type of product
market competition is obscure and the sparse empirical literature is mixed. The results
indicate that product market competition decreases real earnings management and
partially decreases accrual based earnings management. Collectively, product market
competition provides a disciplinary effect on managerial operating decisions and
financial reporting quality.
The second dissertation paper investigates how the type of product market
competition affects Classification Shifting Earnings management. This paper finds that
firms in high product market competition have consistent core earnings levels and
managers in high product market competition are less likely to use classification shifting
earnings management through special items. Furthermore, firms in high product market
competition have less unexpected core earnings and less usage of special items for
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classification shifting earnings management than firms in low product market
competition.
The third dissertation paper examines the impact of product market competition
from existing rivals and potential entrants on corporate tax avoidance behavior. Also, the
paper tests whether firms’ industry competitive status affects corporate tax avoidance.
Results finds that product market competition leads to more aggressive tax reporting
behavior. Specifically, firms in high product market competition from existing rivals are
more likely to engage in tax avoidance whereas firms in high product market competition
from potential entrants less concern about avoiding taxes. In firm level product market
competition analysis, industry following firms are more likely to engage in tax avoidance
than larger and industry leading firms. Collectively, this study finds that it is actually
smaller firms under competitive product market pressure that take advantage of the tax
system.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Product markets are becoming increasingly competitive. Product market
competition from potential entrants and existing rivals is growing as a result of the
number of firm in U.S. product market, globalization, and FTA (Free Trade Agreement).
According to the Economic Census, the number of firms in the U.S. is steadily
increasing. In addition, the number of foreign firms that operate in the U.S. is also
steadily increasing because of globalization and the Free Trade Agreement, the number
of foreign firm which operated in U.S. is also steadily increasing. These factors imply
that firms are more likely to be affected by the competitive condition of the product
market. As such this dissertation examines the effect of product market competition on
firms’ financial reporting quality.
The first dissertation paper examines growing product market competition from
potential entrants and exist rivals on earnings quality. Especially, this study investigates
whether product market competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals
affects managerial operating decisions and financial reporting quality. In prior literature,
theory suggests that firms in intense competition may engage in real earnings
management or accrual based earnings management. However, the differential direction
of the effect of each type of product market competition is obscure and the sparse
empirical literature is mixed because product market competition has a dual effect:
positive effect or negative effect. Relying on previous literature, this study seeks to
improve methodology and proxy construction for product market competition. This paper
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highlights a role of product market competition as motivation or restriction for real
earnings management and accrual based earnings management.
The second dissertation paper investigates how the type of product market
competition affects the classification shifting type of earnings management. Prior
literature suggests that investors appear to recognize a distinction between items closely
related to sales and those that are not as closely related to sales so that managers have an
incentive to increase more core earnings and lower core costs. McVay (2006) and Barua,
Lin, and Sbaraglia (2010) find that firms shift operating expenses to special items and
income-decreasing discontinued operations in order to increase core earnings, and firms
are more likely to do classification shifting earnings management when they are restricted
to do accrual based earnings management. But these papers did not find the determinant
of classification shifting earnings management. This paper highlights a role of product
market competition as motivation or restriction on this earnings management and clarifies
the effect of product market competition on classification shifting earnings management
through special items.
The third dissertation paper examines the impact of growing product market
competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals on corporate tax avoidance
behavior. Although product market competition has a dual effect on financial reporting
quality, the effect on corporate tax reporting, especially tax avoidance, might be different
from the effect on earnings management. This paper initially investigates the effect of
industry level product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals on
four different tax avoidance proxies. Next, this paper examines whether firms’
competitive standing on product market affect corporate tax avoidance behavior. This
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firm level analysis provides to the U.S. Tax regulator an empirical evidence that which
type of firms are likely to abuse the tax system.
In sum, Figure 1 illustrates how this three-paper dissertation strives to contribute
to existing literature by considering influences and benefits associated with growing
product market competition. Broadly, this dissertation investigates the effect of growing
product market competition on financial reporting quality. Specifically, the study begins
by examining the effect of product market competition on three type of earnings
management: real earnings management, accrual based earnings management, and
classification earnings management, and also on corporate tax avoidance behavior. The
dissertation also attempts to make methodological contributions by applying factor
analysis to measure product market competition from potential entrants and existing
rivals. Overall, this dissertation can highlight a role of product market competition on
firms’ earnings managements and tax avoidance behavior.

3
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CHAPTER 2
IS EARNINGS QUALITY ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCT MARKET
COMPETITION?

I. Introduction
Does competition lead firms to better or worse performance? Adam Smith stated
that “monopoly is a great enemy to good management.” It is because firms may be less
motivated to innovate without competition. Fama (1970) also suggests that firms run
more efficiently when they are in competition. When competition is intense, firms run
more efficiently and managers create higher returns for shareholders. However, Cummins
and Nyman (2005) indicate that intense competition leads firms to run inefficiently and
take several high risks. Due to the agency problem, shareholders’ interests are different
from managers’ interests in high competition. There is controversy in the current
academic literature over the impact of market competition on firm performance and
reporting quality. This study investigates the effect of product market competition on
earnings quality. Specifically, the study examines whether product market competition
from potential entrants and existing rivals leads to increased or decreased earnings
management.
Product markets are becoming increasingly more competitive. According to the
U.S. Economic census, the number of firms (establishments) in the U.S. is steadily
increasing1. From 1992 to 2007, the number of firms increased by 148%, starting at
5,829,983 firms in 1992 and rising to 14,436,874 firms in 2007. In the last 15 years, the
number of firms increased by more than 10% per census and had accelerated growth

1

The United States Census Bureau publishes Economic Census every 5 years.
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rates. These statistics indicate that there are more firms in the U.S. product market, which
suggests that product market competition from existing rivals in the U.S. is rapidly
increasing. This increasing number of firms in the market also creates intense
competition from potential entrants into the market. Furthermore, increased globalization
creates intense competition from foreign firms entering the U.S. market. In the August
2012 edition of Survey of Current Business, Thomas Anderson reports that the valueadded by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms increased from 146 billion dollars in 1988 to 649
billion in 2010, representing a 344% increase.
Globalization has vastly broadened the scope of economies so that there are no
physical boundaries to commerce. Firms can easily penetrate foreign product markets.
Dreher (2007) provides an economic globalization index for 207 countries and each
region that includes actual economic flows and restrictions to trade. Dreher’s (2007)
economic index for North America steadily increased from 1970 to 2010, particularly in
the last 20 years (from 1990 to 2010), where growth was 200% higher than the previous
20 years (from 1970 to 1990). This suggests an increased presence of foreign products in
the U.S market, which is expected to continue as trade barriers become less restrictive.
There are few accounting papers about product market competition. Karuna
(2007) investigates the effect of product market competition on managerial
compensation. He finds that the manager of a firm in an industry with intense product
market competition has exacerbated career concern problems. Li (2010) examines the
effect of product market competition on voluntary disclosure. Specifically, Li studies the
effect that product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals has on
the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosure. Taken together these findings leave open
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the question of how earnings quality responds to growing product market competition.
This study addresses this question by evaluating the response of real and accrual based
earnings management to product market competition from potential entrants and existing
rivals. Therefore, the study can answer what the competition’s role for the firm is, and
how the competition affects managers’ exercise of discretion toward increased product
market competition.
This paper measures product market competition from potential entrants and from
existing rivals using separate factor analysis. This research follows Karuna (2007) using
three types of accounting-based measurements of product market competition: product
substitutability, market size, and industry entry costs. Li (2010) uses market
concentration ratio and accounting-based product market competition variables and
derives three components of product market competition: competition from potential
entrants, competition from existing rivals, and industry profitability. The paper modifies
prior literature in measuring product market competition to increase the extraction rate, to
bypass lower Eigenvalue of factors, and to avoid ambiguity in factor3 (industry
profitability). Factor analysis is used separately to derive two factors: product market
competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals.
This study also measures earnings quality using two measures: real earnings
management and accrual-based earnings management. Earnings management is one of
proxies for earnings quality. With more earnings management, earnings quality is lower.
Following Roychowhury (2006) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) to measure real
earnings management, this study estimates real earnings management using three proxies:
(1) sales manipulation, (2) overproduction to reduce the cost of goods sold, and (3)
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reduction of discretionary expenses. Accrual based earnings management is measured
using a cross-section version of the modified Jones (1991) model, including return of
assets, similar to Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). The abnormal value of
discretionary accruals is also used to measure accrual based earnings management.
Extant literature (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Healy and Wahlen
1999; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012) suggests that managers exercise discretion not
only via their choice of accounting estimates and methods (i.e., accrual based earnings
management), but also through operational decisions (i.e. real earnings management).
Real earnings management occurs through management’s operating decisions and
activities. There are at least three reasons why product market competition may impact
real earnings management. First, real earnings management reflects management
decisions. Product market competition influences managerial operating decisions and
slack. Second, real earnings management is costly as it directly affects cash flows (Cohen
and Zarowin 2010) and firm value (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Third, contrary to
accrual based earnings management, real earnings management reflects the firm’s
efficiency. Thus, instead of accrual based earnings management, this study focuses on
real earnings management using three different real earning management activities.
Prior literature finds that the association between product market competition and
one type of earnings management. Tinaikar and Xue (2009) find that highly competitive
industries induce insiders of firms to smooth earnings and record higher accruals,
whereas Marciukaityte and Park (2011) indicate that competition reduces misleading
earnings management and improves earnings quality. Both studies use accrual based
measures of earnings management but obtain contradictory results. Also, Balakrishnan
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and Cohen (2013) investigate the effect of competition on financial accounting
misreporting. They find limited evidence that product market competition acts as a
disciplinary mechanism.
The results of this paper indicate that product market competition acts as a
managerial disciplinary mechanism because product market competition reduces real
earnings management and accrual based earnings management. Product market
competition from potential entrants and existing rivals significantly decreases total real
earnings management, and production cost and discretionary expense real earnings
management. Also, product market competition from potential entrants significantly
decreases accrual based earnings management However, the effect of product market
competition on cash flow real earnings management differs from that on other types of
real earnings management and product market competition from existing rivals does not
effect on accrual based earnings management. Furthermore, this paper confirms the
substitute relationship between real earnings management and accrual based earnings
management within competitive product markets.
Finally, this study performs a robustness test using a new measurement of product
market competition from Li, Lundholm, and Minnis (2013) in which they count the
number of times a firm uses the word "competition" and close variants of competition in
its 10‐K statement filed with the SEC. This new measurement encompasses product
market competition from both potential entrants and existing rivals because the firm
recognizes product market competition from both existing rivals and potential entrants
when using the word “competition” and close variants of competition in its 10-K. This
measurement is used as a control variable to control managerial perceptions of product
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market competition, and added it to our factor analysis to derive two new factors to
supplement the former factors’ scope. The multivariate regressions with the new product
market competition measurement and with additional control variables support the main
results that product market competition from potential entrant and existing rivals
decreases real earnings management and product market competition from potential
entrant increases accrual based earnings management.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we find that
product market competition has a disciplinary effect on managerial operating decisions.
Contrary to dual effect of product market competition, intense product market
competition decreases real earnings management. Especially, product market competition
from potential entrants and existing rivals have significant disciplinary effect on
production cost and discretionary expense real earnings management. Furthermore, the
study provides empirical evidence that product market competition from potential entrant
provides a disciplinary effect on accrual based earnings management with controlling real
earnings management because the competition from potential entrants decreases accrual
based earnings management. Additionally, we resolves the controversial results between
Tinaikar and Xue (2009) and Marciukaityte and Park (2011). The results support the
finding that firms’ accrual based earnings management through abnormal accruals
depend on type of product market competition. Especially, product market competition
from potential entrants motivate firm to less accrual based earnings management whereas
product market competition from existing rivals has no effect on accrual based earnings
management. Finally, this paper modifies the method of measuring product market
competition on three different dimensions. Following Karuna (2007) and Li (2010), this
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paper better captures product market competition by utilizing modifying factor analysis.
The factor analysis provides a higher extraction rate, no lower Eigenvalue, and no
ambiguity of measurement. Also, this study uses a new measurement of competition from
10‐K and enters the new measurement into factor analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant
prior research and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design with
empirical methodology and variable selection. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 represents the robustness test with new measurement of product market
competition. Section 6 concludes the study with a discussion of results and implications
for future research.

II. Hypothesis development
Product market competition is a double edged sword in that it can positively or
negatively affect a firm. One stream of literature suggests that product market
competition provides a positive effect on firms. Product market competition reduces
agency problems, runs efficiently, lowers managerial slack, and pressures productivity
and innovation (Fama 1980; Hart 1983; Nickell, Wadhwani, and Wall 1992; OECD
2002). However, another steam of literature suggests that intense product market
competition can negatively affect the firm. High product market competition exacerbates
agency problems and career concerns, leads to less optimal management decisions, and
increases bankruptcy risk. (Hermalin and Weisbach 2007; Narayanan 1985; Scharfstein
1988). There is no consensus about the effect of product market competition.
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In one stream of literature product market competition pressures firms to run efficiently.
Hart (1983) provides a model to explain the effect of product market competition on
agency conflicts and asserts that product market competition reduces agency problems by
reducing managerial slack. Reducing managerial slack aligns shareholders’ and
management’s interests in industries with intense product market competition. A number
of studies investigate the positive effect of product market competition on managerial
effort and productivity. Hermalin (1992) indicates that product market competition
improves managerial performance. Nickell et al. (1992) and Nickell (1996) find that
product market competition leads to increased managerial effort, better performance, and
productivity growth. Blundell, Griffith, and Reenen (1999) suggest that the firms in
industries with high product market competition are more likely to innovate. Griffith
(2001) suggests that increases in product market competition are associated with
increases in productivity. In highly competitive industries, firms will generate higher
productivity and performance by improving the alignment of manager and shareholder
interests. Therefore, product market competition has a positive effect on efficiency,
productivity, managerial performance, and the agency problem.
A number of studies (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Healy and
Wahlen 1999; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2007) suggest that managers exercise
discretion not only via their choice of accounting estimates and methods (i.e., accrual
based earnings management), but also through operational decisions (i.e. real earnings
management). Real earnings management occurs through management’s operating
decisions and activities. Although product market competition influences earnings quality
through managerial decision-making and managerial discretion, it more directly relates to
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management’s operational decisions; real earnings management is a direct reflection of
management’s operational decisions. Product market competition influences managerial
decisions, managerial slack, and reactions to career concerns. Furthermore, whether
intense product market competition affects managerial performance and productivity
depends on managerial operating decisions. Contrary to accrual based earnings
management, real earnings management reflects the firm’s efficiency. Using a sample of
UK manufacturing firms, Nickel (1996) provides evidence that intense product market
competition is associated with high productivity. Thus, instead of accrual based earnings
management, real earnings management is affected appropriately by product market
competition.
Prior literature highlights the role of product market competition as a disciplinary
mechanism. Hart (1983) indicates that product market competition imposes discipline by
reducing managerial slack. Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) suggest that intense competition
disciplines managers’ behavior by mitigating moral hazard problems. Berger and Hann
(2007) show that product market competition is positively related to firms’ productivity
and cost efficiency. Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013) find that product market competition
is an efficient disciplinary mechanism and reduces financial accounting misreporting.
Managers are motivated to engage in beneficial actions through product market
discipline. Therefore, one role of the disciplinary mechanism of product market
competition is less earning management. This leads to the following disciplinary
mechanism hypotheses:
Disciplinary mechanism hypothesis: High product market competition leads to less real
earnings management.
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However, other streams of literature report that product market competition also
has negative effects on firms. Scharfstein (1988) points out that, without considering
managerial compensation, intense market competition increases agency problems. He
indicates that Hart’s (1983) model did not include a proxy for managerial compensation
in the market equilibrium model and thus his model yields the opposite directional effect
of product market competition on the agency problem. Cummins and Nyman (2005)
indicate that intense competition pressures manager to use private information to make
inefficient decisions, which leads to lower managerial performance and future
productivity. Furthermore, several papers find that product market competition increased
several risks. Cummins and Narayanan (1985) suggests that executives with career
concerns have incentives to engage in managerial actions that boost short-term
performance at the expense of creating long-run shareholder value. Hermalin and
Weisbach (2007) indicate that career concerns lead executives to manipulate financial
reporting to public capital markets. Karuna (2007) provides evidence that the manager of
a firm in an industry with intense product market competition has exacerbated careerconcern problems. Therefore, product market competition also has a negative effect on
managerial decisions, career concern, and the agency problem. This stream of literature
suggests that product market competition exacerbates career concerns and motivates
earnings management. Schimdt (1997) and Raith (2003) indicate that product market
competition increases career concerns and liquidation risk. Shleifer (2004) suggests that
intense competition provides pressure and leads to unethical and opportunistic behavior
of management (earnings management). Bagnoli and Watts (2010) provide a theoretical
prospective about more direct examination of the relation between competition and
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earnings management by showing the costs versus benefits of earnings management. The
result is that if a manager believes that rivals in the industry are also managing earnings,
a firm in an industry is encouraged to manipulate earnings. This behavior is exacerbated
when competition is greater in the industry, thus leading to firms in the industry
managing earnings on average. Competitive pressure encourages the managers to be
myopic and thus manipulate earnings to boost short-term performance. This leads to the
following opportunistic behavior hypotheses:
Opportunistic behavior hypothesis: High product market competition leads to more
real earnings management.

This study also considers the association of total discretionary accruals with
product market competition. Product market competition also has a dual effect on accrual
based earnings management. In prior literature, there are controversial results about the
relationship between product market competition and accrual based earnings
management. Tinaikar and Xue (2009) find that highly competitive industries induce
insiders of firms to smooth earnings and record higher accruals, whereas Marciukaityte
and Park (2011) indicate that competition reduces misleading earnings management and
improves earnings quality. Therefore, accrual based earnings management may be
positively or negatively affected by product market competition.
However, product market competition has different effects on accrual based
earnings management from the effect of product market competition on real earnings
management. First, the cost of accruals earnings management is different from cost of
real earnings management. Zang (2012) directly examine the relationship between real
earnings management and accrual based earnings management with considering costs of
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two different types of earnings management. The study suggests that firms engage in
more of the other when one earnings management is relatively more costly. The cost of
real earnings management includes firm’s industry product market competitive status,
financial health, and tax behavior whereas the cost of accrual based earnings management
includes audit quality, SOX, accounting flexibility, and the length of their operating cycle
(the days receivable plus the days inventory less the days payable). Because product
market competition is one type of firm’s industry product market competitive status,
product market competition is directly connected to the cost of real earnings
management. But, accrual earnings management is not constrained by product market
competition because its costs are not directly connected to the competition in the product
market. Due to different costs of earnings management, real earnings management and
accrual based earnings management would have different relationship with product
market competition.
Also, the positive effect of product market competition is mainly related to the
operating activities of a firm. For example, product market competition has a disciplinary
effect on firms because it reduces managerial slack (Hart 1983), increases managerial
performance (Hermalin 1992), increases productivity growth (Nickell 1996), and
increases innovation (Blundell et al. 1999). But these effects have no clear and direct
effect on accrual based earnings management. Therefore, the disciplinary effect of
product market competition is more significantly impact real earnings management due
to better managerial operating decisions. Thus, the effect of product market competition
on accruals based earnings management would be different from effect of product market
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competition on real earnings management. Thus, this leads to following differential effect
hypothesis:
Differential effect hypothesis: The effect of PMC on accruals earnings management is
different from effect of PMC on real earnings management.

III. Research design
Data and sample
To investigate the relationship between product market competition and real
earnings management, this study obtains data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1993
to 2011. This study excludes financial firms which have four-digit standard industrial
classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999 (Finance, insurance, and real estate
sectors). To avoid ambiguity for industry classification and earnings management
measurement, the study excludes observations with a zero value for the fourth digit of
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code because firms must have identical four-digit
SIC codes across all observations in the final sample, consistent with Karuna (2007), Li
(2010), and Kim, Park, and Wier (2012). The final sample for relationship for product
market competition and real earnings management is 13,126 firm-years.
Product market competition
To measure product market competition, this study relies on measures developed
in Karuna (2007) and Li (2010). Karuna adopts accounting variables to measure product
market competition. He measures market competition with three determinants: industry
PP&E, product market size, and price-cost margin. Li modifies Karuna’s measurements
and uses principle component analysis to construct new variables. First, she categorizes
market competition variables and then creates three factors from nine variables. This
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study uses factor analysis based on Karuna (2007) and Li (2010). However, this study
modifies both of the above methods for product market competition measurements. To
avoid lower extraction rate and Eigen value, factor analysis runs separately by product
market competition variables. The proxies could be categorized into the following three
groups:
A. Proxies for product market competition from potential entrants


Industry-average size of property, plant, and equipment



Industry-average R&D expense



Industry-average capital expenditures



Industry-aggregate sales

B. Proxies for product market competition from existing rivals


Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)



Four-firm concentration ratio



Total number of firms operating in an industry

C. Proxies for industry profitability


Industry average ROA (return on assets)

18

4

Eigenvalue
2.1097
0.0709
-0.0203
-0.1129

Factor1
0.4115
0.0590
0.5209
0.0484

Factor1
0.9277
0.4835
0.9394
0.3645

Proportion
1.0304
0.0346
-0.0099
-0.0552

Cumulative
1.0304
1.0650
1.0551
1.0000

Eigenvalue
1.9234
0.0819
-0.1688

Variables
HHI
FthRatio
NumFirm

Panel C: Scoring Coefficients

Variables
HHI
FthRatio
NumFirm

Panel B: Factor Loadings

Factor
B1
B2
B3

19

Factor2
0.2114
0.6498
-0.1452

Factor2
0.7817
0.9136
-0.6912

Proportion
1.0474
0.0446
-0.0919

Competition From Existing Rivals
Panel A: Factor Analysis with Correlation

Variable Definitions:
Factor1 = Proxies for competition from potential entrants. High value is high product market competition
Factor2 = Proxies for competition from existing rivals. High value is high product market competition.
AVGPPE = Industry-average size of Property, plant, and equipment
AVGR&D = Industry-average R&D expense
AVGCAP = Industry-average capital expenditures
IND-Sale = Industry-aggregate sales
HHI
= Herfindahl-Hirchman Index
FthRatio = Four-firm concentration ratio
NumFirm = Total number of firms operating in an industry

Variables
AVGPPE
AVGR&D
AVGCAP
IND-Sale

Panel C: Scoring Coefficients

Variables
AVGPPE
AVGR&D
AVGCAP
IND-Sale

Panel B: Factor Loadings

Factor
A1
A2
A3
A4

Competition From Potential Entrants
Panel A: Factor Analysis with Correlation

Table 1
Results from Factor analysis for Product Market Competition

Cumulative
1.0474
0.0920
1.0000

To reduce the number of variables for product market competition and still
capture the various effects of product market competition, this study separately conducts
factor analysis2. Also, the study derives only two factors for product market competition
from potential entrants and from existing rivals because product market competition for
industry profitability is an ambiguous concept and lowers Eigenvalue. The results of
factor analysis are reported in Table 1. Factor 1 is derived from AVGPPE, AVGR&D,
INDMKT, and AVGCAP, suggesting that Factor1 reflects product market competition
from potential entrants. Lower value of Factor1 is higher product market competition
from potential entrants. To avoid confusing interpretation, this study defines product
market competition from potential entrants as PMC_F = - Factor 1. Factor 2 is derived
from HHI, FTHRATIO, and NUMFIRM, suggesting that Factor 2 represents product
market competition from existing rivals. Lower value of Factor 2 is higher product
market competition from existing rivals. Same as Factor 1, the study defines product
market competition from existing rivals as PMC_C = - Factor 2. To control character of
industry profitability, the study uses IND-ROA as a control variable in the regression
analysis.
Real earnings management
This study relies on prior studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin
2010; Roychowdhury 2006) to develop proxies for real earnings management.
Specifically, this paper uses the following three measures as proxies: (1) abnormal levels
of operating cash flow, (2) abnormal level of production costs, and (3) abnormal level of

2

This factor analysis uses Varimax rotation to derive two factors for product market
competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals. Regardless a type of rotation option,
the two factors are consistent meaningful proxies for product market competition from potential
entrants and from existing rivals.
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discretionary expenses. The abnormal level of each type of real earnings management is
measured as the residual from the relevant estimation models mentioned below.
First, Roychowdhury (2006) defines sales manipulation as managers’ attempts to
temporarily boost sales during the year by offering price discounts or more lenient credit
terms, which in turn lowers cash inflow. Therefore, sales manipulation is expected to
result in a lower current-period cash flow. Following prior studies (Cohen et al. 2008;
Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006), this study models normal CFO as a
linear function of sales and change in sales:

𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝑆
∆𝑆
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽1 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽2 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1

(1)

Where CFOit is operating cash flow in year t of firm I, ATit is firm i’s lagged total
assets over year t, Sit is firm i’s net sales in year t, and ∆Sit is firm i’s change in net sales
from prior years. For every firm-year, abnormal operating cash flow is the difference
between the actual CFO and the “normal-level” CFO from equation (1).
Second, prior studies (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010;
Roychowdhury 2006) define production costs as the sum of the cost of goods sold and
the change in inventory during the year. Similarly, COGS is defined as a linear function
of contemporaneous sales:

𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑆
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽1 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
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(2)

Where COGSit is firm i’s cost of goods sold in year t. Similarly, this study models
inventory growth as a linear function of the contemporaneous and lagged change in sales:

∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
∆𝑆
∆𝑆
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽1 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽2 ( 𝑖𝑡−1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3)
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1

Where ∆INVit is firm i’s Change in inventory in year t. Following previous
literature (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006), the
following is used to estimate the normal level of production costs by using (2) and (3):

𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑆
∆𝑆
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽1 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛽2 ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) +
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
∆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡−1

𝛽3 (

(4)

The abnormal production cost is the difference between actual production costs
and “normal” production costs.
The third measure of real earnings management is abnormal level of discretionary
expenses. This study models discretionary expenses as linear function of sales:

𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑆
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + β ( 𝑖𝑡⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1

(5)

Where DISEXPit is Discretionary expenses in year t of firm i defined as the sum
of research and development, advertising, and sales, general, and administrative
expenses. As noted by Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), modeling
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discretionary expenses as a function of current sales creates a mechanical problem if
firms manage sales upward to increase reported earnings in a certain year, resulting in
significantly lower residuals from a regression using current sales in that year. To address
this issue and estimate normal discretionary expenses, discretionary expenses are
expressed as a function of lagged sales. For every firm-year, the abnormal discretionary
expenditure is the difference between actual discretionary expenses and “normal”
discretionary expenses.
Cohen et al. (2008) indicates that firms which manage earnings upward are likely
to have one or all three measures of real earnings management: unusually low operating
cash flow, and/or unusually high production costs, and/or unusually low discretionary
expenses. Therefore, they compute a single proxy by combining the three individual real
earnings management variables to capture the effects of real earnings management
through all of these variables in a comprehensive measure. They use both the combined
proxy and the three individual real earnings management proxies. Following Cohen et al.
(2008), this study uses three individual proxies (CFREM, PRODREM, and
DISEXPREM) and a combined proxy (TOTREM) in the analyses and reports results
corresponding to the combined real earnings management proxy as well as the three
individual activity manipulation proxies. Considering the expected directions of three
variables, this paper calculates TOTREM as (CFREM – PRODREM + DISEXPREM).
The combined real earnings management proxy decreases as firms engage in more
aggressive earnings management through real activities.
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Accrual based earnings management
Prior literature (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005;
Subramanyam 1996) uses measures of discretionary accruals for earnings quality and
earnings management. Following DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), this study uses a
cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model due to its superior specification and
less restrictive data requirement. Furthermore, as in Kothari et al. (2005), this study
includes return on assets in prior years as a regressor in the estimation model to control
for the effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals.
This study uses the residuals from the annual cross-sectional industry regression
models as estimates of accrual based earnings management. To avoid potential
misspecification and enhance the reliability of discretionary accrual estimates, this study
includes prior year’s return on asset, following Kothari et al. (2005). The following
regression is the estimation model of accrual based earnings management:

(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 )
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
⁄𝐴𝑇
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (1⁄𝐴𝑇 ) + 𝛼2 (
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡−1

(6)

Where TAit is firm i’s total accruals at year t, ∆REVit is firm i’s change in net
revenues in year t from year t-1, ∆RECit is firm’s i’s change in net receivables, PPEit is
firm i’s gross property, plant, and equipment, and ATit-1 is firm i’s lagged total assets at
year t-1. This study uses the abnormal level of discretionary accruals as accrual based
earnings management.
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Regression models
This section describes an empirical model where the effect of product market
competition on earnings quality is predicted. To capture the effect of product market
competition on earnings equality, this paper estimates the following models:

𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 IND − ROA𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(7)

AccrualEM𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 IND − ROA𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(8)

Where REMit is frim i’s proxy for real earnings management, total real earnings
management (TOTREM) consist of cash flow real earnings management (CFREM),
production cost real earnings management (PRODREM), and discretionary expense real
earnings management (DISEXPREM); TOTREM = CFREM - PRODREM +
DISEXPREM. AccrualEMit is firm i’s proxy for accrual based earnings management,
Abnormal accruals based on modified Jones model adjusted for performance, PMC_Fit is
proxy for competition from potential entrants for firm i’s at year t, PMC_Cit is proxy for
competition from existing rivals for firm i’s at year t, IND-ROAit is industry average
ROA (Return on Asset) for firm i’s at year t, LNATit firm i’s natural logarithm of total
assets at year t-1, BMit is firm i’s Book-to-Market equity ratio year t-1, measured as
BE/MVE, ROAit is firm i’s ROA, measured as income before extraordinary items scaled
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by total assets at year t-1, and LEVit firm i’s long-term debt scaled by total assets at year
t-1.
This study estimates two multivariate regression models. In these models, there
are two different earning quality variables: i.e. real activities manipulate and
discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the management of firms has an option to choose
between the two different earning manipulation mechanisms using the technique that is
less costly to them (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). Zang finds that the tradeoff between
the two earnings management methods is a function of their relative costs. To control for
the substitutive nature of these two earnings management methods, consistent with Cohen
et al. (2008), this study includes AccrualEM, a proxy for accrual based earnings
management, as a control variable in the real activities manipulation regressions and
includes TOTREM, a proxy for real activities manipulation, as a control variable in the
accrual based earnings management regressions.

IV. Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
In table 2, this paper presents the sample means, standard deviation, minimum,
and maximum value (See note of Table 2 for variable definitions). The mean value of
CFREM, PRODREM, DISEXPREM, and TOTREM are -3.7699, -2.8073, -0.0167, and 6.5449 respectively, suggesting that firms do not seem to engage in activities of real
earnings manipulation on average. However, the mean of AccrualEM are 0.3376,
indicating that firms do seem to engage in activities of accrual based earning
manipulation.
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Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations. The correlations of total real earnings
management (TOTREM) with the two factors of product market competition are -0.056,
and 0.192, respectively, indicating that real earning manipulating activities are associated
with two different factors of product market competition. Furthermore, the correlations of
accrual based earnings Management (AccrualEM) with two factors of product market
competition are -0.061, and 0.218, respectively, suggesting that high product market
competition is associated with accrual based earning manipulation. The correlations of
accrual based earnings management with total real earnings management, operating cash
flow real earnings management, production cost real earnings management, and
discretionary expense real earnings management are 0.158, -0.150, -0.049, and 0.153,
respectively, suggesting that it is a substitute relationship except for relationship between
accrual based earnings management and operating cash flow real earnings management
and thus firms choose between the two earning manipulation mechanisms by selecting
one against another or selecting both.
The effect of product market competition on total real earnings management
Table 4 reports the result of multivariate regression analysis using measures of the
total amount of real earnings management. All test statistics and significant levels are
based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the year levels and
industry levels. This study shows p-values in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate
significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively, versus a null coefficient of zero.

29

For the regression of TOTREM on product market competition, the estimated
coefficient for PMC_C is positively significant (p-value < 0.01) on Model 1. This result
indicates that product market competition from existing rivals leads to less total real
earnings management. But, product market competition from potential entrants (PMC_F)
has an insignificant and positive effect on real earnings management. Regression of
Model 2 uses fixed effect of industry classification by two-digit SIC codes. The estimated
coefficients for PMC_F and PMC_C are positively and highly significant at p-value <
0.0001 and p-value < 0.01, respectively, indicating that the intense product market
competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals leads to less total real
earnings management. To control effect of industry profitability to earnings management,
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this study inserts IND-ROA variable to the regression model. In sum, these results
support that product market competition has disciplinary effect on managerial operating
decision making.
The result is obtained after controlling accrual-based earnings management. The
estimated coefficient for the accrual-based earnings management variable, AccrualEM, is
positively significant on both models at p-value < 0.0001 and p-value < 0.01,
respectively. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2012), and Zang (2012),
this result indicates that firms choosing to engage in earnings management through real
activities are less likely to engage in accrual based-earnings management. Turning to
other control variables, the estimated coefficients on LNAT, BM, and LEV are positive
with significance levels ranging from t-statistic = 2.28 to t-statistic = 11.80 whereas the
estimated coefficient on ROA is negatively significant at p-value < 0.0001. These
estimated coefficients indicate that smaller, more growth, less profitable, more leveraged
firms are more likely to engage in real earnings manipulating activities.
The Effect of Product Market Competition on Each Type of Real Earnings
Management
Table 5 reports the result of multivariate regressions analysis using each of the
three measures of real earnings management. Again, all test statistics and significant
levels are based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the year
levels and industry levels.
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For the regression of CFREM, the estimated coefficient for PMC_F is negatively
significant (p-value < 0.001), implying that competition from potential entrants increases
cash flow real earnings management. Next, the estimated coefficient for PMC_C is
negatively significant (p-value < 0.05). This result indicates that competition from
existing rivals leads to more cash flow real earnings management.
For the regression of PRODREM, the estimated coefficients for all explanatory
variables reverse direction because of measurement of production real earrings
management. The estimated coefficient for PMC_F is negatively and closed significant at
t-value = -1.34, implying that intense competition from potential entrants decreases
production real earnings management. Next, the estimated coefficient for PMC_C is
negatively significant (p-value < 0.05). This result indicates that high competition from
existing rivals leads to less production real earnings management.
For the regression of DISEXPREM, the estimated coefficient for PMC_F is
negatively and closed significant at p-value < 0.0001, implying that intense competition
from potential entrants decreases discretionary expense real earnings management. Next,
the estimated coefficient for PMC_C is negatively significant (p-value < 0.05). This
result indicates that intense competition from existing rivals leads to less real earnings
management through using discretionary expenses. In sum, product market competition
from potential entrants and existing rivals mainly decreases production and discretionary
expense real earnings management but increase cash flow real earnings management.
This result indicates that product market competition makes differential effect on cash
flow real earnings management from other types of real earnings management.
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The effect of product market competition on accrual based earnings management
Table 6 reports the results of multiple regression analysis using measures of
accrual based earnings management. Again, all test statistics and significant levels are
based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the year levels and
industry levels.

For the Model 1 regression of accrual based earnings management (AccrualEM),
the estimated coefficient for PMC_F is - negatively significant (p-value < 0.0001). For
the Model 2 regression with fixed effect of industry classification, PMC_F is negatively
significant at p-value < 0.001. These results indicate that product market competition
from potential entrants leads to less accrual based earnings management. However, the
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competition from existing rivals has insignificant effect on accrual based earning
management on both Model 1 and Model 2. Next, the estimated coefficients for INDROA are negative with significance levels t-statistic = -3.04 and t-statistic = -3.00,
respectively, suggesting that firms in less profitable industries are more likely to use
accrual based manipulation activities. Also, the result is obtained after controlling real
earnings management. The estimated coefficients for the real earnings management
variable, TOTREM, are positively significant (p-value < 0.0001). Consistent with prior
literature, this result indicates that the firm choosing earnings management through
accrual based earnings management is less likely to engage in real earning management.
Table 6 reports that product market competition from potential entrants provides a
discipline effect on accrual based earnings management with lower earnings
manipulation activities.
In sum, product market competition has a significant effect on earnings quality:
Product market competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals. Product
market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals mainly decrease effect on
earnings management. Product market competition from potential entrants and existing
rivals leads firms to engage in less total real earnings management. Therefore, product
market competition provides a disciplining effect on managerial operating decision.
However, the effect of product market competition on cash flow real earnings
management is different from that on other types of real earnings management. Also,
product market competition from potential entrants provides a disciplining effect on
accrual based earnings management with decreasing accrual based earnings management.
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V. Robustness Test
To provide construct validity for product market competition proxies, this study
again uses factor analysis with a new proxy of product market competition by Li et al.
(2013). They start with management perception in order to measure product market
competition. Because the SEC recommends that the management discussion and analysis
(MD&A) section of the firm’s 10-K filing include a discussion of the firm’s competitive
position, the MD&A section is a good source to check managers’ perception about
competition. They measure management’s perceptions of the intensity of product market
competition which managers face by using textual analysis of the firm’s 10-K filing.
They simply count the number of occurrences of “competition, competitor, competitive,
compete, and competing” scale by the total number of words. Its measurement responds
to management’s concern about product market competition at the firm level.
This study investigates whether competitive environment of product market can
influence earnings quality: real earnings management vs. accrual based earnings
management. This new measurement is directly related to managers’ perception of their
product market situation and environment so that the dimension of new measurement can
provide additional aspect of product market competition. The managers’ perception of
product market can include all three dimensions: existing rivals, potential entrant, and
industry profitability. Even though new measurement can be overlapped by existing
factors’ scope, mangers’ perception can provide additional power to measure “true”
product market competition. Therefore, this study uses this new product market
competition measurement as a control variable and adding it into factor analysis.
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First, this study uses the new product market competition measurement
(PCTCOMP) as control variable because the new measurement reflects the managers’
perception of product market. The managers’ perception of product market could have
effect on managerial operating decision. To control manager’s perception, the new
measurement is added into regression model as a control variable. Second, the study adds
this new product market competition measurement to the factor analysis and derive new
two factors to supplement the former factors’ scope.
The “new” factor analysis inputs nine variables, PCTCOMP (new measurement
of Li et al, 2013), HHI, FTHRATIO, AVGPPE, INDMARGINE, AVGR&D, AVGCAP,
and NUMFIRM. Similar to main factor analysis, this analysis derives two factors because
Factor 3’s Eigenvalue is less than 1 and the cumulative ratio is over 1. The results of
“new” factor analysis are reported in Table 7. Panel B and C indicate that the manager’s
perception (PCTCOMP) covers both product market competition categories from
potential entrants and existing rivals. Similar to main factor analysis, the “new” factor
analysis derives two factors: New Factor1 reflects product market competition from
potential entrants, and New Factor2 represents product market competition from existing
rivals. Same as main factor analysis, this study changes a direction and defines “new”
product market competition from potential entrants (existing rivals) as New PMC_F
(New PMC_C) = - New Factor 1 (- New Factor 2).
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40
0.444
481.6
6,305
Yes

***
***
***
***

0.98
-0.68
-10.69
-3.80
5.16
-10.75

1.361
-0.203
-0.437
-0.306
4.04
-0.233

0.442
490.5
6,305
6,305

-0.183
-0.177
1.670
-0.206
-0.450
-0.312
4.087
-0.229

Coef.

-2.97
-1.72
1.16
-0.70
-11.43
-3.86
5.20
-10.12

T-val

***
***
***
***

***
*

0.401
64.0
6,305
6,305

-0.428
-0.023
-0.015
0.042
-0.259
-0.018

Coef.
-0.031
-0.030
0.015

0.402
65.2
6,305
6,305

PRODREM
T-val
Coef.
-2.42 **
-2.03 **
0.89
-0.029
-0.026
-2.62 ***
-0.398
-0.56
-0.022
-3.12 ***
-0.015
3.02 ***
0.042
-3.65 ***
-0.259
-5.49 ***
-0.018
-2.13
-2.05
-2.38
-0.54
-3.13
2.98
-3.65
-5.36

T-val

***
***
***
***

**
**
**

0.442
444.1
6,305
6,305

-2.481
0.590
1.045
0.656
-8.771
0.572

Coef.
0.527
0.539
-0.796

0.440
453.9
6,305
6,305

DISEXPREM
T-val
Coef.
3.59 ***
1.86 *
-2.32 **
0.461
0.474
-0.74
-3.252
0.79
0.595
10.54 ***
1.076
3.29 ***
0.671
-4.79 ***
-8.888
10.73 ***
0.561

2.91
1.86
-0.95
0.80
11.26
3.35
-4.83
10.11

T-val

***
***
***
***

***
*
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*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
Table 8 presents results from the regressions of each type of Real earnings management (Cash flow real earnings management, Production cost real
earnings management, and Discretionary expense real earnings management) on New factors of Product Market Competition from potential entrants
and from existing rivals. All continuous variables are winsorized by 1%.
Variable Definitions:
PCTCOMP = Proxies for Managerial Perception for product market competition. New PMC measurement by Li et al. (2013)
New PMC_F = Another Proxies for competition from potential entrants. New PMC_F = -1× New factor1. High value is Higher product market
competition.
New PMC_C = Another Proxies for competition from existing rivals. New PMC_C = -1× New factor2. High value is higher product market
competition.
See Table 2 for the definition of other variables.

Adj. R-square
F-value
Sample Size
Fixed Indeffect

PMC_F
PMC_C
PCTCOMP
New PMC_F
New PMC_C
IND-ROA
AccrualEM
LNAT_1
BM_1
ROA_1
LEV_1

CFREM
T-val
-3.63 ***
-1.73 *
2.40 **

Coef.
-0.210
-0.202
0.332

Table 9
Robustness Results from Regressing each type of Real Earnings Management on New factors of Product Market Competition
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Table 8 shows coefficients from cross-sectional regression of total real earnings
management on product market competition by using the manager’s perception
(PCTCOMP). For the regression of TOTREM on both Models, this study uses the
PCTCOMP as a control variable on Model 1 and use “new” product market competition
variables, on Model 2, which are derived with the PCTCOMP. Model 1’s result suggests
effect of product market competition on real earnings management with controlling
manager’s perception of competition whereas Model 2’s result suggests effect of product
market competition, including manager’s perception of competition on real earnings
management. On Model 1, the estimated coefficients for PMC_F and PMC_C, are
positively significant with significance levels t-statistic 3.48 and 2.07, respectively,
suggesting that product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals
leads to less total real earnings management. The estimated coefficient of PCTCOMP is
negatively significant, indicating that firms where manager’s has high perception of
competition are more total real earnings management. On Model 2, the estimated
coefficients for New PMC_F and New PMC_C are also positively significant at t-statistic
2.82 and 2.09, respectively, suggesting that higher competition from potential entrants
and existing rivals lead to less total real earnings management. These results on Table 8
supports the main result that product market competition has a disciplining effect on
manager’s operating decision making. Overall, the main results of this study are robust.
Table 9 reports the result of multivariate regressions analysis with three measures of real
earnings management. Each type of real earnings management has two models with
original PMC variables with PCTCOMP and with New PMC variables. For the
regressions of CFREM, the estimated coefficients for PMC_F and PMC_C on Model 1
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are negatively significant while the estimated coefficient for PCTCOMP is positively
significant. With New PMCs, the estimated coefficients for New PMC_F and PMC_C are
negatively significant. This result indicates that competition from potential rival and
existing rivals leads to more cash flow real earnings management and also high
manager’s perception about product market competition decrease cash flow real earnings
management. These regressions with adding control variable of manager perception and
new PMC variables mainly confirm the main results that product market competition
leads to more cash flow real earnings manipulation activities. For the regression of
PRODREM, the estimated coefficients for PMC_F and New PMC_F on both models are
negatively significant at significant level -2.42 and -2.13, respectively, indicating that
product market competition from potential entrants leads to less product cost real
earnings management. Next, the estimated coefficients for PMC_C and New PMC_C are
positively significant at significant level -2.03 and -2.05, respectively, suggesting that
product market competitions from existing rivals leads to less production real earnings
management. All results with production real earnings management confirm the main
results of this study. For the regression of DISEXPREM, the estimated coefficients for
PMC_F and New PMC_F on both models are positively significant at both p-values <
0.001, confirming the result of a negative relationship between product market
competition from potential entrants and discretionary expenses real earnings
management. The estimated coefficients for PMC_C and New PMC_C are both
marginally significant at t-statistic 1.91 and 1.93, respectively. This result supports the
main result that product market competition from existing rivals decrease real earnings
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management through the use of discretionary expenses. In sum, all robustness analyses
support the main result and thus the main results of this study are robust.
Table 10 reports the results of two different multiple regression analyses with new
product market competition measurement for accrual based earnings management. For
the Model 1 regression of AccrualEM, the estimated coefficient for PMC_F is negatively
significant at p-value =0.002 whereas the estimated coefficient for PMC_C is
insignificant. This result confirms mainly the results of this study that product market
competition from potential entrants leads to less accrual based earnings management but
product market competition from existing rivals has no significant effect on accrual based
earnings management. On the Model 2 regression with New Factors, the estimated
coefficient of New PMC_F is negatively significant at p-value < 0.01 whereas the
estimated coefficient of New PMC_C is not significant. This result indicates that intense
competition from potential entrants leads to less accrual-based earnings management but
competition from existing rivals does not have significant effect on accrual-based
earnings management. The estimated coefficients for the real earnings management
variable, TOTREM, on both Models are both positively significant at t-statistic 2.16 and
2.14, respectively, confirming the substitute relationship between accrual based earnings
management and real earnings management. Consistent with the main findings, this result
indicates that product market competition from potential entrants provides the
disciplining effect on accrual based earnings management.
Overall, robustness tests with the manger’s perception (PCTCOMP) confirm the
main findings of this study. This study uses a new measurement of competition from 10‐
K as inserting it as a control variable and entering it in factor analysis. The multivariate
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regression supports main results that product market competition from potential entrants
decreases real earnings management and accrual based earnings management and product
market competition from existing rivals decreases real earnings management. Thus,
product market competition from potential entrants has the disciplining effect on both
earnings managements and product market competition from existing rivals has the
disciplining effect on only real earnings management.

VI. Conclusion
This paper examines whether product market competition has an effect on firm’s
earning quality. Due to the dual effect of product market competition, this paper
hypothesizes that product market competition has positive or negative effect on earnings
quality. The effect of product market competition on real earnings management and each
of three different activities is mainly investigated in this paper. Furthermore, the study
examines effect of product market competition on accrual based earning management.
Based on prior literature, the effect of product market competition on real earnings
management is expected to be similar or different from that on accrual based earnings
management.
The overall findings of the paper support that effect of product market
competition has a significant effect on real earnings management. Product market
competition from potential entrants and from existing rivals induces less total real
earnings management. In each of the three real earnings management activities, product
market competition from both potential entrants and existing rivals leads the firm to
engage in less production cost and discretionary expense real earnings management,
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except for an opposite effect of competition on cash flow real earnings management.
Overall, product market competition decreases real earnings management, suggesting that
product market competition has a disciplining effect on managerial operating decision.
Regarding accrual based earnings management, product market competition from
potential entrants decrease the chance of a firm engaging in earning management whereas
product market competition from existing rivals does not have effect on accrual based
earnings management, suggesting that product market competition partially provides a
disciplining effect too. Therefore, the product market competition has disciplining effect
on managerial operating decision and earnings quality.
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First, this paper
provides evidence of a relationship between product market competition and real earning
management. Some papers have examined the relationship between product market
competition and accrual based earnings management, but prior literature has not
investigated the effect of product market competition on real earnings management.
Through investigating relationship between product market competition and real earnings
management, this study suggests that product market competition has a disciplining effect
on managerial operating decisions. Second, this paper provides evidence to resolve the
controversial results regarding the relationship between product market competition and
accrual based earnings management. Tinaikar and Xue (2009) find that highly
competitive industries induce insiders of firms to smooth earnings and record higher
accruals, whereas Marciukaityte and Park (2011) indicate that market competition
reduces misleading earnings management and improves earnings quality. This paper
provides evidence that intense competition from potential entrants is related to less
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accrual based earnings management. Third, this paper provides a better methodology for
examining product market competition. Although the result of the factor analysis in the
paper is similar to that of Li (2010), the study separately derives three factors in order to
derive higher extraction rate and coverage. Furthermore, the study adopts Li et al.
(2013)’s new product market competition measurement by controlling manager’s
perception of competition and including it into the factor analysis. Furthermore, this
paper provides a practical regulatory contribution. Because high industry product market
competition provides a disciplinary effect on managerial operating decisions and
financial reporting quality through lower real earnings management and lower accrual
based earnings management, the regulator should motivate high competition in industry
and prohibit an M&A in lower competition industry.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECT OF PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION ON CLASSIFICATION
SHIFTING OF EARNINGS MANAGERMENT

I. Introduction
Earnings management has been the focus of many papers, but most of this
literature has focused on two general earnings management methods: accrual based
earnings management and real earrings management. Several papers have examined the
effect of product market structure on accrual based earnings management and real
earrings management. However, no papers investigate the effect product market structure
on classification shifting earnings management. This paper examines impact of product
market competition on classification shifting earnings management.
In prior literature, many studies investigate the relationship between product
markets and manager’s earnings management. In term of accrual based earnings
management, Tinaikar and Xue (2009) find that highly competitive industries induce firm
insiders to smooth earnings and record higher accruals. But Marciukaityte and Park
(2011) suggest the opposite effect, that competition reduces misleading earnings
management and improves earnings quality. No paper investigates product market
condition of manager’s earning manipulation through classification shifting.
In earnings management literature, a few papers have focused on classification
shifting earnings management. McVay (2006) concludes that managers opportunistically
shift core expenses to special items to inflate current core earnings. Fan, Baruna, Cready,
and Thomas (2010) confirms McVay’s (2006) finding in quarterly special items with
more classification shifting during the fourth quarter. Barua et al. (2010) suggest that
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managers use classification shifting to manage earnings when reporting discontinued
operations.
However, firms’ earnings performance poses a challenge because the magnitude
and frequency of classification shifting earnings management are markedly higher among
firms experiencing poor performance (McVay 2006). This paper examines why firms
experiencing poor performance use classification shifting earnings management and the
impact of product market competition on classification shifting earnings management.
Following the second chapter of this dissertation, this paper uses factor analysis to
derive two different sources of product market competition: product market competition
from potential entrants and from existing rivals with controlling industry profitability.
Product market competition from potential rival are measured by industry-average size of
property, plant, and equipment and, research and development expense, capital
expenditures, and industry-aggregate sales. Product market competition from existing
rivals is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirchman Index, four-firm concentration ratio,
and total number of firms operating in an industry. To control industry profitability, this
study uses industry average of return on assets. In robustness test, this study rerun factor
analysis with managers’ perception of product market competition. Li et al. (2013)
provide new product market competition measurement by counting number of
“Competition” and similar words in 10-K report. With this variable, this study can
control firm level product market competition by managers’ perception.
This study finds that product market competition leads to consistent core earnings
levels. Specifically, firms in industries with high levels of product market competition
from potential entrants and existing rivals have lower unexpected core earnings.
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Furthermore, product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals has a
differential effect on classification shifting earnings management through special items.
That is, product market competition leads managers to use less classification shifting
earnings management through special items. This paper also finds that firms in high
product market competition subgroups are less likely use classification shifting earnings
management. Therefore, these results provide some evidence of the disciplinary effect of
product market competition. However, the study finds inconsistent results between
analysis with unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in core earnings, and
between analysis with other control variables and that without other control variables.
Furthermore, new factors with managerial perception of product market competition do
not provide strong explanatory power to explain classification shifting earnings
management in robustness test. Although the robustness tests confirm the main results of
this study, managerial perception does not provide additional explanatory power.
This study makes three contributions to the existing accounting literature. First, it
investigates the relationship between product market condition and classification shifting
earnings management. McVay (2006) indicates that firms experiencing poor performance
are more likely use classification shifting earnings management. This paper examines this
relationship while considering varied levels of product market condition and confirms
that intense product market condition has a differential effect on classification shifting
earnings management. The main findings of this study suggest that product market
competition leads to less usage of classification shifting earnings management through
special items. Second, this paper finds that product market competition leads to consistent
core earnings levels. High product market competition, both from potential entrants and
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existing rivals, has strong negative association with unexpected core earnings so that
firms in high product market competition have less volatile core business earnings.
Finally, this paper finds some drawbacks in the research design for classification shifting
earnings management. The results are not consistent between unexpected core earnings
and unexpected change in core earnings, and between models with and without other
control variables. The drawback of classification shifting earnings management research
design calls for a better methodology design in future research.
In the next section this paper develops hypotheses and describes the data, sample
and descriptive statistics in Section III. In Section IV, the paper describes the research
design and measurement of product market competition and classification shifting
earnings management. Section V reports tests of hypotheses, while Section VI concludes
the study.

II. Hypothesis Development
Prior literature has focused on two types of earnings management: accrual based
earnings management and real earnings management; however, classification shifting
earnings management has received less attention in prior literature. Classification shifting
earnings management is distinct from both accrual based and real earnings management.
Classification shifting earnings management differs from accrual and real earnings
management on several dimensions, the most significant being that it does not change
GAAP earnings. If users of financial statements focus on only GAAP earnings (Net
Income), classification shifting would be pointless. However, investors appear to
recognize distinction between items closely related to sales and those that are not as
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closely related to sales and weight individual line items within the income statement
differently (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Davis 2002; Elliott and Hanna 1996; Francis,
Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Lipe 1986). Although income increasing (income decreasing)
accrual based earnings management and real earnings management raise future
performance expectations and reduce earnings in future periods, classification shifting
earnings management raises future performance expectation and does not reduce earnings
in future period. This suggests that classification shifting earnings management does not
have a “settling up” because next period’s earnings are equal to actual earnings without
additional earnings management. Finally, GAAP net income does not change, limiting
the scrutiny of auditors and regulators.
McVay (2006) hypothesizes that managers have incentives to report core
expenses as income decreasing special items in an attempt to inflate core earnings, and he
presents empirical evidence supportive of classification shifting earnings management in
the form of a positive relation between income-decreasing special items and unexpected
annual core earnings. The firm tends to report higher than expected core earnings with
increasing income and decreasing special items. Fan et al. (2010) apply this research
design of classification shifting earnings management on quarterly special items. They
show that classification shifting earnings management is more likely in the fourth quarter
than in other quarters and classification shifting earnings management is more likely
when the ability of managers to manipulate earning via accrual based earnings
management is constrained and in meeting a range of earnings benchmarks. Barua et al.
(2010) test classification shifting earnings management using discontinued operations.
Barua et al. (2010) find that firms shift operating expenses to income-decreasing

52

discontinued operations in order to increase core earnings and that managers use
classification shifting to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. However, McVay (2006) shows
that the magnitude and frequency of classification shifting earnings management are
markedly higher among firms experiencing poor performance. These studies investigate
classification shifting earnings management using different data (i.e. quarterly special
items) and different items (i.e. discontinued operations) but do not investigate what
factors lead to more classification shifting earnings management.
In prior literature, product market competition has a dual effect on earnings
management: negative and positive effect. One stream of literature suggests that product
market competition reduces earnings management. As a result of lower agency costs
through lower managerial slack and increasing productivity, managers have the same
interest as owners and are less likely to manage earnings. Griffith (2001) suggests that
product market competition aligns manager’s interest with shareholder’s interest in
increasing productivity. Marciukaityte and Park (2011) indicate that competition reduces
misleading earnings management and improves earnings quality. Balakrishnan and
Cohen (2013) show that product market competition reduces financial accounting
misreporting. Callahan, Pownall, and Ryou (2013) confirms that product market
competition serves a disciplinary function by reducing real earnings management.
However, there is also a steam of literature assert that suggests that product
market competition increases earnings management. This literature suggests that intense
competition increase manager’s career concern and bankruptcy risk, and thus managers
are more likely to manage earnings. Narayanan (1985) indicate that product market
competition increases career concerns and leads to harmful managerial actions for
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shareholders. Furthermore, managers in intense competition use private information to
make inefficient decisions (Cummins and Nyman 2005) and high product market
competition makes managers manipulate financial reporting (Hermalin and Weisbach
2007). Tinaikar and Xue (2009) find that highly competitive industries induce insiders of
firms to smooth earnings and record higher accruals.
The effect of product market competition on earnings management has been
studied for accrual based and real earnings management. While the effect on accrual
based earnings management is not clear, the effect on real earnings management is clear
because of managerial discipline effect of product market competition. No study
investigates the effect of product market competition on classification shifting earnings
management. Classification shifting earnings management would be different from
accrual based earnings management and real earnings management because of less usage
of accrual based earnings management and the lower cost of classification shifting
earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) find that accrual based earnings management
is less likely to be used after SOX. With less usage of accrual based earnings
management, classification shifting earnings management could be used as a substitute.
There is more substitution when the ability of managers to manipulate accruals appears to
be constrained (Fan et al. 2010).
This study uses two main constructs of product market competition, competition
from existing rivals and competition from potential entrants (Callahan et al. 2013; Li
2010). Firms faced with the threat of product market competition from existing rivals
represent immediate competition in product market. Although product market
competition has dual effect, the effect of product market competition is restricted to one
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side because of uniqueness of classification shifting earnings management. Classification
shifting earnings management is different from other two types of earnings management.
Classification shifting earnings management do not have future reduction period of prior
earnings management, no change of GAAP earnings, and less risk of scrutiny of SEC and
Auditor. Therefore, because of lower costs of classification shifting earnings management
and no obvious harm to shareholders, product market competition motivates a manager to
manage earning through classification shifting. Thus, this leads to following hypothesis:
H1: Product market competition from existing rivals increases classification shifting
earnings management.

Contrary to Product market competition from existing rivals, product market
competition from potential entreats is not immediate competition. Competition from
potential entrants pose a less immediate threat to a firm and have a less direct impact on a
firm. Therefore, firms under this type of competitive influence will feel less pressure to
take immediate steps to manage earnings via classification shifting. Product market
competition from potential entrants does not comprise the immediate threat that product
market competition from existing rivals does. Furthermore, firms facing competition
from potential entreats can work more on managing market perceptions by manipulating
earnings in an upward direction thereby seeking investment capital with a strong financial
position. Thus, from potential entrant can leads to more classification shifting earnings
management because of market perceptions and uniqueness of classification shifting
earnings management. Same as first hypothesis, this leads to following hypothesis:
H2: Product market competition from potential entrants increases classification shifting
earnings management.
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III. Research Design
Data and Sample
The sample used in this study is comprised of data from North America
Compustat. The initial sample period cover the years 1985 to 2008. First, this study filters
out all incomplete observations. Second, this study use sales as a scalar, observations
with sales less than $1 million are removed in order to avoid outliers. Last, this paper
require a minimum of 15 observations per industry per fiscal year for a sufficient large
pool to estimate expected core earnings. This paper use Fama and French 48 industry
classification. The final sample used for empirical analyses contains 83,447 firm-year
observations, with 13,361 firms.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of this paper. The
mean core earning for all firm is 0.0184. Mean income-decreasing special items is 4.53%
percent of sales. The mean of unexpected core earnings is -0.0068. Table 12 show
correlations among selected variables. Core earnings is significantly negative correlation
with product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals at p-value <
0.0001 and 0.05, respectively, suggesting that firm in high competition has less core
earnings level. But, unexpected core earning is negatively significant correlation with
product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals at p-value <
0.0001, except for unexpected core earnings with product market competition from
existing rivals. This indicates that high product market competition lead to consistent
core earnings level and less chance of unexpected core earnings.
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Measures of Classification Shift Earnings Management
This study follows McVay (2006) to measure core earnings, expected core
earnings, unexpected core earnings, and the unexpected change in core earnings. Core
earnings is defined as operating earnings before depreciation and special items, scaled by
revenue. To estimate unexpected core earnings and the unexpected change in core
earnings, this study uses the following models.

𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(9)

∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑2 ∆𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑3 ∆𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑4 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜑5 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑5 ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑6 𝑁𝐸𝐺_∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡

(10)

Where CEit = Core earnings, calculated as (Sales – Cost of Goods Sold – Selling,
General and Administrative Expenses)/Sales where Cost of Goods Sold and Selling,
General, and Administrative Expenses exclude Depreciation and Amortization, ∆CEit+1 is
Change in Core Earnings, calculated as CEt+1 - CEt, ATOit is Asset Turnover Ratio,
defined as Salest / ((NOAt + NOAt-1/2), where NOA (Net Operating Assets) is equal to
the difference between Operating Assets – Operating Liabilities. Operating Assets is
calculated as Total Assets less Cash and Short-Term Investment. Operating Liabilities is
calculated as Total Assets less Total Debt, less Book Value of Common and Preferred
Equity, less Minority Interests, ∆ATOit is Change in asset turnover, calculated as ATOit ATOit-1, ACCRUALSit is Operating Accruals, calculated as (Net Income before
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Extraordinary Items - Cash from Operations) / Sales, ∆SALESit is Percentage change in
Sales, calculated as (SALESt - SALESt-1) / SALESt-1, and NEG_∆SALESit is percentage
change in Sales (∆SALESt) if ∆SALESt is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.
This study measures the expected value of core earnings and the change in core
earnings for firm i using the predicted values from equations (1) and (2), respectively.
The study estimates each equation by industry and year, excluding firm i from the
estimation. Unexpected core earnings and the unexpected change in core earnings are the
difference between the actual and predicted value of equations (1) and (2). To provide
evidence of the effect of product market competition on classification shifting earnings
management, this study tests differences in estimated coefficient of special items between
lower and higher product market industries use multivariate analysis through interaction
variable between special items and product market competition variables.
Measures of Product Market Competition
These measures for product market completion are drawn from recent
developments in accounting literature (Callahan et al. 2013; Karuna 2007; Li 2010): a
eight variable structure organized into three factors. This structure is seen below:
A. Proxies for competition from potential entrants
a. Industry-average size of Property, plant and equipment
b. Industry-average R&D expense
c. Industry-average capital expenditures
d. Industry Product Market Size
B. Proxies for competition from existing rivals
a. Herfindahl-Hirchman Index
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b. Four-firm concentration ratio
c. Total number of firms operating in an industry
C. Proxies for industry profitability
a. Industry average return on assets

The first dimension of product market competition represents product market
competition from potential entrants (PMC_F). The variables which measure this
construct represent barriers to market entry. The first variable in this category is industry
property plant and equipment (IND-PPE), which is measured by the weighted average of
property plant and equipment of all firms in an industry. It is weighted by a firm’s market
share. The second variable in this category is industry research and development (INDR&D), which is measured by the weighted average of research and development of all
firms in an industry. It is weighted by a firm’s market share. The third variable in the
potential entrants category is industry capital expenditures (IND-CPX). IND-CPX
represents the weighted average of capital expenditures of all firms in an industry, and is
weighted by a firm’s market share. The final variable in the potential entrants category is
industry product market size (IND MKTS). IND-MKTS is likely to be negatively
associated with potential competition. It is measured as the natural log of aggregate
industry sales. This study aggregates the above discussed four variables into one factor
representing product market competition from potential entrants by using factor analysis,
and a high value in this factor represents higher product market competition (i.e. high
initial investment barriers results in more fear of potential rivals entering the industry).
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The second dimension of product market completion represents competition from
existing rivals (PMC_C). The three variables in this factor represent the product market
competition faced by firms as represented by the number and density of rivals in an
industry. The first variable in this category is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (INDHHI), which is measured as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in an industry.
The second variable is the Industry concentration ratio (IND-CON4), which is measured
by taking the sum of market shares of the largest four firms in an industry. And the final
variable in the second dimension of product market competition is the industry number
variable (IND-NUM). IIND-NUM is simply the total number of firms in the industry.
This study aggregates the above discussed three variables into one factor representing
product market competition from existing rivals by using factor analysis, and a high value
in this factor represents higher product market competition (i.e. industries with many
competitors are considered more competitive).
Finally, as established by prior product market competition literature industry
profitability (IND-PROFIT) must be controlled for. Li (2010) use two components for
industry profitability. The first component of the final factor is the return on assets (INDROA), which is measured as the pre depreciation aggregate operating profit of the
industry divided by the aggregate total assets of the industry. The second and final
component of the third factor is the price-cost margin (IND-MGN), which is measured as
the aggregate sales in the industry divided by the aggregate operating costs of the
industry. However, This study use IND-ROA to control industry profitability instead of
deriving a factor from two components because of only two component and highly
correlation between components, consistent with Callahan et al. (2013).
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Regression Model
The regression models for investigating effect of product market competition on
classification shifting through special item are following:

𝑈𝐸_𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 %𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 %𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(11)

𝑈𝐸_∆𝐶𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 %𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3 %𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃6 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃7 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃8 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡+1

(12)

Where UE_CEit is firm i’s unexpected core earning in year t, and UE_∆CEit is
firm i’s unexpected change in core earnings in year t+1, the difference between reported
and predicted core earnings and change in core earnings. The variable %SIit is definded
as income-decreasing special item. PMCit is firm i’s product market competition from
potential entrants and existing rivals at year t, SIZEit is firm i’s natural logarithm of total
assets at year t, BMit is firm i’s ration of book value to market value at year t,
ACCRUALSit is firm i’s operating accruals at year t, OCFit is firm i’s operating cash flow
at year t, and ROAit is firm i’s Return on Asset, measured by income before extraordinary
items over total assets.
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V. Empirical Results
Main Regression Analysis
Table 13 reports regression analysis of unexpected core earnings on percentage of
special items and product market competition in panel A. All tables in this study shows tstatistics in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10, respectively, versus a null coefficient of zero. Following McVay (2006), the left
three regression models use only variables of interest because other firm level risk factors
are already applied when unexpected core earnings is measured. But the right three
regression models insert five different control variables, following Barua et al. (2010).
Note that a positive special item corresponds to an income decreasing special items so
that the estimated coefficient of special item percentage is expected to be positive for
unexpected core earnings, and the estimated coefficient of special item percentage is
expected to be negative for unexpected change in core earnings. As expected, special
items are positively associated with unexpected core earnings in all six models with or
without product market competition and other control variables for risk, suggesting that
firms with high income decreasing special items have more unexpected core earnings. All
models show that product market competition from potential entrants is not significantly
negative without other control variables but is positively significant with other control
variables. However, product market competition from exiting rivals is consistently
negatively significant with and without other control variables. These results indicate that
product market competition from existing rivals does not lead to unexpected core
earnings, whereas product market competition from potential entrants does not have the
effect on unexpected core earnings. With an interaction variable between special item and

64

product market competition, the four estimated coefficients are insignificant. Also, Table
13 additionally reports the full effect, direct effect, and indirect effect of product market
competition on classification earnings management in Panel B1. The full effect and direct
effect of product market competition from both potential entrants and existing rivals are
negatively significant, suggesting that high product market competition leads to less
unexpected core earnings. However, with special items, the indirect effect is different and
significant. Overall, product market competition from potential entrants and existing
rivals leads to less unexpected core earnings and thus more consistent core earnings.
In Table 14, Panel A reports coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of
unexpected core earning change on special items and product market competition with or
without controlling for risk factors. As expected, special items are negatively associated
with unexpected change in core earnings in all six models with/without product market
competition and other risk control variables. Importantly, special items have a
significantly negative association with unexpected change in core earnings with other risk
control variables. This negative coefficient represents that managers use special items to
increase core earnings level. Whereas the estimated coefficients of product market
competition from potential entrants are negatively inconsistent without other control
variables, the estimated coefficients of product market competition from potential
entrants are significantly positively association, implying that product market competition
from potential entrants leads to unexpected change in core earnings. With interaction
between unexpected change in core earnings and product market competition from

1

This study use The Sobel-Goodman tests to test whether special items carry the
influence of product market competition on Classification Shifting Earnings management. Direct
effect is the influence of product market competition to Unexpected Core Earnings (Unexpected
Change in Core earnings). Indirected effect is the influence through Special Items.
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potential entrants, the estimated coefficient without other control variables is positively
significant at p-value < 0.01, suggesting that high product market competition leads to
less usage of classification shifting earnings management with special items. In terms of
product market competition from existing rivals, product market competition is
negatively associated with unexpected change in core earnings with or without other
control variables.
With interaction between unexpected change in core earnings and product market
competition from existing rivals, the estimated coefficient without other control variables
is positively significant at p-value < 0.01, suggesting that high product market
competition leads to less usage of classification shifting earnings management with
special items. Also, Panel B in Table 13 reports full effect, direct effect, and indirect
effect of product market competition on classification earnings management by
unexpected change in core earnings. Full effect, direct effect, and indirect effect of both
product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals are negatively
significant, suggesting that high product market competition leads to less unexpected
change in core earnings. The Panel B indicates that product market competition lead to
less unexpected change in core earnings and thus less usage of special items for
classification shifting earnings management. In sum, the result are consistent with
managers classifying some core expenses as special in the year a special item is
recognized and high product market competition leading to more consistent core earnings
and less unexpected change in core earnings in Table 13 and Table 14
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Regression analysis with subgroups of product market competition
This study classifies the sample to five subgroups and use three subgroups:
lowest, medium, and highest competition group. Table 15 shows the regression analysis
with product market competition both from potential entrants and from existing rivals.
Panel A reports regression analysis of unexpected core earnings on special items among
three subgroups by product market competition from potential entrants. Special items are
positively associated with unexpected core earnings at p-value < 0.0001 in lower and
middle subgroups while special items are not significantly positively associated with
unexpected core earnings in high subgroup. Also, the difference between low and high
competition subgroups is -0.3346 and is statistically significant. These results indicate
that managers classify some core expenses as special in the year a special item for
earnings management in low and middle product market competition from potential
entrants, and high product market competition from potential entrants leads to less usage
of classification shifting earnings management. Panel B reports regression analysis of
unexpected core earnings on special items among three subgroups by product market
competition from existing rivals. In all subgroups, special items are positively associated
with unexpected core earnings, but the significance level in low product market
competition subgroup from existing rivals is much stronger than high product market
competition subgroup.
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Table 16 shows the regression analysis with both product market competition
from potential entrants and from existing rivals. Panel A reports regression analysis of
unexpected change in core earnings on special items among three subgroups by product
market competition from potential entrants. Contrary to Table 15, the result indicates that
firms in high product market competition from potential entrants have more classification
earnings management through special items and the difference is marginally significant.
These different effects might be related to the research design method for core earnings
level used to investigate classification shifting earnings management. Panel B reports
regression analysis of unexpected core earnings on special items among three subgroups
by product market competition from existing rivals. Special items in low competition
from existing rivals are negatively significant, suggesting that managers classify some
core expenses as special in the year a special item in lower product market competition
from existing rivals. In Table 15 and Table 16, high product market competition mainly
leads to less usage of classification shifting earnings management.
In sum, the main analysis confirms that firms use special items for classification
shifting earnings management and find that high product market competition leads to less
unexpected core earnings, and thus firms in high product market competition are less
likely to classify some core expenses as special items in the year. Thus, firms in high
product market competition have consistent core earnings level. However, some results
are not consistent within unexpected core earnings and unexpected change in core
earnings and require another research design for classification shifting earnings
management.
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V. Robustness Tests
To provide construct validity for product market competition proxies, this study
uses factor analysis with a new proxy of product market competition by Li et al. (2013),
as in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Li et al. start with management perception in order to
measure product market competition. They simply count the number of occurrences of
“competition, competitor, competitive, compete, and competing” scale by the total
number of words. Its measurement responds to management’s concern about product
market competition at the firm level. As in Chapter 2, this study adds this new product
market competition measurement to the factor analysis and derives new factors of
product market competition to supplement the former factors’ scope. The “new” factor
analysis inputs nine variables, including PCTCOMP (new measurement from Li et al.
2013). Same as main factor analysis, New PMC_F (New PMC_C) implies higher “new”
product market competition from potential entrants (existing rivals).
Table 17 shows coefficients from cross-sectional regression of unexpected core
earnings on special items and product market competition by using the managers’
perception (PCTCOMP) with or without other control variables. As in the main analysis,
special items have a significantly positive association with unexpected core earnings for
all models. Whereas product market competition from potential entrants have positive
significance, product market competition from existing rivals is negatively insignificant.
This implies that proxies for product market competition with managers’ perception
capture main proxies differently. The interaction variable between special items and
product market competition from potential entrants is negatively significant, and the
interaction variables between special items and product market competition from existing
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rivals is still negatively associated with unexpected core earnings, suggesting that
managers in high product market competition are less likely to use special items for
classification shifting earnings management. Also, Panel B reports full, direct, and
indirect effects of product market competition on unexpected core earnings. But, as with
the main analysis, product market competition from potential entrants and from existing
rivals has less unexpected core earnings. Table 18 shows coefficients from the crosssectional regression of unexpected change in core earnings on special items and product
market competition by using the managers’ perception (PCTCOMP) with or without
other control variables. As in the main analysis, special items have a significantly
positive association with unexpected change in core earnings for models with other
control variables. Also, Panel B reports full, direct, and indirect effects of product market
competition on unexpected change in core earnings. In sum, all robustness analyses
support the main results, and thus the main results of this study are robust.

VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of product market competition on classification
shifting earnings management. The second chapter of this dissertation finds that product
market competition has a disciplinary effect on real earnings management and marginally
decreases accrual based earnings management. Due to the uniqueness of classification
shifting earnings management, it would be considered an alternative for firms when they
are unable to use real earnings management and accrual based earnings management.
This study finds that product market competition acts as a mediator for
classification shifting earnings management. While firms use special items for
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classification shifting earnings management, high product market competition leads to
less usage of classification shifting earnings management through special items.
Specifically, firms in high product market competition subgroups use less classification
shifting earnings management than those in low product market competition subgroups.
Furthermore, product market competition leads to more consistent core earnings. High
product market competition has a strong negative association with unexpected core
earnings and a positive association with unexpected change in core earnings. These
results indicate that firms in high product market competition have consistent core
earnings and less fluctuation from unexpected events.
This paper makes three contributions to the accounting literature. First, it is the
first paper to investigate the impact of product market competition on classification
shifting earnings management. Although several papers find an association between
product market competition, accrual based earnings management, and real earnings
management, no paper focuses on the association between product market competition
and classification shifting earnings management. It is more challenging for some firms to
use accrual based earnings management, and thus they use classification shifting earnings
management. Second, this paper finds that firms in industries with high levels of product
market competition have strongly consistent core earnings levels. The consistent core
earnings indicate that firms in high product market competition have less fluctuation in
their core business and operating cycles. Third, this paper finds a drawback of
classification shifting earnings management. The results of the analysis for unexpected
core earnings are inconsistent with those for unexpected change in core earnings. The
results, using additional control variables, are also different from those without control
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variables. Therefore, this paper calls for better research design for classification shifting
earnings management.
Future research should examine the research design of classification shifting
earnings management studies. These methodological considerations should address the
problem with control variables and inconsistent results between unexpected core earnings
and unexpected change in core earnings. Additionally, while testing classification shifting
earnings management, prior literature and this paper consider accrual based earnings
management but not real earnings management. Therefore, the relationship between real
earnings management and classification shifting earnings management should be a topic
for future research in order to fill the gap in the current accounting literature.
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CHAPTER 4
TAX AVOIDANCE: DOES COMPETITION MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

I. Introduction
This study examines the impacts of product market competition from existing and
potential entrants on corporate tax avoidance behavior. Prior research shows that tax
avoidance behavior is difficult in countries with strong enforcement (Desai, Dyck, and
Zingales 2007). Research also suggests that in countries with strong regulatory and
enforcement structures the goal of upward earnings management and tax avoidance are
somewhat mutually exclusive goals (Coppens and Peek 2005). In general, doing more of
one of these behaviors means doing less of the other if a firm is in a highly regulated
climate. Therefore, firms in the highly competitive product market are torn between
looking financially stronger to attract investment and posture against rivals, and
undertaking the task of engaging in tax avoidance. This study predicts that product
market competition will force firms into making the choice that most benefits them long
term, and this choice will differ depending on the type of product market competition a
firm faces (i.e., either product market competition from existing rivals or potential
entrants).
Unlike the extensively researched tax avoidance field, academic research in
product market competition is a fairly recent addition to accounting literature. A new set
of proxies was proposed and utilized by Li (2010) to describe product market competition
in more detail. Callahan et al. (2013) modify Li’s (2010) proxies to avoid ambiguity in
the type of product market competition by using factor analysis. Two factors are derived
from this process— product market competition from potential entrants and existing
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rivals. Following Callahan et al.’s (2013) approach, this study defines the construct of
product market competition on these two dimensions. Product market competition from
existing rivals is captured by a function of the number of rivals, as well as two different
concentration ratios that represent the market share in an industry. Product market
competition from potential entrants is measured by industry level R&D expense, capital
expenditures, PP&E (the sunk costs of entering the industry) and industry aggregate
sales. This breakdown is critical to the theoretical structure of the study as it is expected
that the two main dimensions of product market competition discussed above will impact
tax avoidance differently. This study believes that firms in intense product market
competition from existing rivals will be engaged in greater tax avoidance in order to
boost immediate cash flow. In contrast, the study proposes that the less immediate threat
of potential entrants will leave firms torn between the intuitive behavior of maximizing
cash flows and the “window dressing” of impression management—i.e., firms will feel
pressured into showing strength in the form of high profits as a means of posturing in the
capital market (Davidson 2004).
The impact of the discussed product market competition variables will be tested
against a wide array of tax avoidance proxies. Following McGuire, Omer, and Wang
(2012), four different tax avoidance methods are measured by examining book effective
tax rates, cash effective tax rates, total book-tax differences, and discretionary permanent
book-tax differences. While all four of these proxies correlate with each other, they also
capture distinctly different tax avoidance behaviors (McGuire et al. 2012).
This study is motivated by recent calls for corporate tax reform in the United
States. The high tax rates in the U.S. (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009), as well as the robust
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competition that exists due to the country’s capitalistic system, imply that if there is a
relationship between competition and tax avoidance, the United States will have
significant issues in regards to it. Understanding the impact of competition on how firms
interact with the U.S. tax system will allow this study to contribute to the debate on what
approach would work best for maximizing governmental tax revenue.
To obtain the study’s results, the North American Compustat database is utilized.
This study conducts an empirical analysis using a sample of 22,739 firm years from
1991-2012, and regress four measures of tax avoidance on two measures for product
market competition while controlling for various firm-specific variables that have been
shown to influence tax avoidance in prior research. Furthermore, the study regresses the
four selected tax avoidance proxies on two measures of market leader status (and related
control variables) in a firm level analysis.
Results from empirical analyses reveal that tax avoidance behavior is positively
correlated with product market competition from existing rivals. In contrast, firms facing
competition from potential entrants appear to be less concerned with avoiding taxes.
They are perhaps more concerned with managing impressions by showing higher income
amounts in order to posture in the capital market. Next, the firm level analysis
demonstrates that the larger and more dominant firms are less likely to engage in
avoiding taxes than smaller and industry following firms. While U.S. congressmen (e.g.
Levin and McCain 20131) use large and visible firms like Apple to make political
statements, it is actually smaller firms under competitive pressure that take advantage of
the system. The larger firms are seemingly more concerned with showing strong earnings
See for example “Apple CEO Defends Tax Practices as Proper“ (Linebaugh and Lessin
2013; Wall Street Journal)
1
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and managing impressions in an effort to continue the free flow of investment capital.
Furthermore, larger firms are more likely to avoid the political and regulatory spotlight.
This line of argument is consistent with the majority of real earnings management
research that demonstrates how firms doggedly pursue investment capital by showing
higher profits even though the manipulation of actual operations is problematic
(Roychowdhury 2006).
Overall, this paper contributes to both tax avoidance and product market
competition literature. This study is the first to test the influence of different types of
industry level product market competition on tax avoidance behavior. Product market
competition is one of determinant of corporate tax avoidance reporting behavior. Next,
the study finds the effect of firm level product market competition on tax avoidance
behavior. This topic is a highly relevant issue for U.S. regulators as the United States is
both high in competition and corporate tax rates. If small firms dealing with intense
product market competition from existing rivals are most likely to avoid taxes, perhaps a
less complex tax code would allow regulators to target these firms rather than focusing on
the largest firms due to time constraints.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses prior
research and develops hypotheses; Section III describes research design; Section IV
presents sample selection, descriptive statistics, and main regression results; Section V
discusses sensitivity analysis; and finally, Section VI concludes.
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II. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
Prior Research
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) extensively
document the general status of tax avoidance research in accounting. They also note a
great number of determinants and outcomes of corporate tax reporting behavior. A
significant quantity of prior research (e.g. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012;
Gaertner 2010; Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver 2010) discusses management’s incentives
to avoid taxes which are generally straightforward (i.e., superior cash flow).
Unlike the above mentioned tax avoidance behaviors sought by management that
result in quantifiable savings, firms are also focused on the practice of impression
management (i.e., putting forth a strong operational image of the firm). Davidson,
Jiraporn, Kim, and Nemec (2004) discuss how the management of earnings is a subset of
the general construct of impression management, and this study focuses on the earnings
management aspect of impression management. Earnings management can be
accomplished in two main ways. Firms can engage in the somewhat less potent in terms
of the amount of manipulation possible but can be engage easier by a practice of accrual
based earnings management (discussed in DeFond and Subramanyan 1998; Jones 1991;
Kothari et al. 2005; Subramanyam 1996). This practice amounts to little more than the
use of accounting techniques to show a more desirable earnings. Such processes do not
change the underlying firms’ operations and operational strategy.
However, in pursuit of further changes to financial statements, firms have readily
shown the propensity to engage in “real earnings management”. Simply put, this is a
behavior in which firms actively change firm operating policy to boost earnings. A firm

87

might shift sales from one period to another, engage in discounting, or any other number
of behaviors all for the purpose of showing a higher earnings. Roychowdhury (2006),
Cohen et al (2008), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that firms are willing to change
actual firm activities to show a higher earningswhich may in turn lead to increased
taxationin order to show higher earnings levels and appear strong in the capital
markets. Prior literature demonstrates the connection between real earnings management,
accrual based earnings management, and product market competition (see Callahan et al.
2013; Marciukaityte and Park 2012; Tinaikar and Xue 2009). Callahan et al. (2013) find
that product market competition serves as a method of managerial discipline in regards to
managerial operating decisions.
Unlike the robust stream of literature seen in the area of tax avoidance and
earnings management, product market competition literature in accounting is still a rather
new phenomenon. Karuna (2007) investigates association between managers’ incentives
and product market competition and provides product market competition variables in
accounting research by utilizing accounting based variables to measure product market
competition. Karuna’s study is extended by Li’s (2010) research, which included a more
diverse array of proxies classified into three groups: Proxies for competition from
potential entrants, proxies for competition from existing rivals, and proxies for industry
profitability. Recently, Callahan et al. (2013) modifies product market competition
measurement by utilizing factor analysis in order to avoid some of the ambiguity of the
product market competition concept, to improve the factors’ coverage, and to increase
extraction rate.
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Development of Hypotheses
In prior literature, there is a controversial definition of corporate tax avoidance. In
line with Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), this study uses a broad definition of tax
avoidance in hypotheses, where tax avoidance is a reduction of explicit taxes. Thus, this
definition includes all behaviors that are both legal and illegal. Under the theory and
empirical proxies used in this paper, common and legal tax avoidance such as buying tax
exempt municipal bonds would be included. Gray behaviors that perhaps lack a valid
business purpose but follow the letter of the law are accounted for as well. Examples of
such behaviors include transfer pricing schemes or other practices to shift income
overseas into tax havens. Finally, illegal and aggressive behaviors are included as well
since the definition of tax avoidance used in this study only focuses on a reduction of
taxes paid, and such a reduction can be obtained in legal, debatable, or illegal ways.
Examples of such illegal behaviors include fraud or abusive tax shelters. Based on the
broad definition of tax avoidance, this study uses a varied group of proxies to define tax
avoidance in this study. Tax avoidance in this paper includes all legal and illegal tax
reporting behavior.
The first issue is the impact of product market competition on various measures of
tax avoidance over a broad U.S. sample. Karuna (2007) finds that different competitive
pressures from the product market cause shifts in managerial incentives. Karuna’s study
is the first in accounting literature to define product market competition as more than a
unidimensional construct, and later studies such as Li (2010) have gone on to classify
three types of product market competition.
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When defining product market competition, this study uses two main constructs in
line with Li (2010) and Callahan et al. (2013). Li shows that product market competition
from existing rivals and product market competition from potential entrants are dealt with
differently. Li demonstrates that one way firms face product market competition from
potential rivals is to use disclosure as a means of posturing. Good news can be used as a
means of attracting investment, while bad news can deter other rivals. Li also shows that
firms concerned with higher product market competition from existing rivals take the
very practical strategy of engaging in low disclosure and focusing on firm operations.
Also, Callahan et al. (2013) find that product market competition from existing rivals has
a strong managerial discipline effect whereas product market competition from potential
entrants has marginal effect. For the purposes of capturing both of these observed
empirical realities (i.e., the posturing and practical) in the test, this study utilizes both
constructs.
While at first it might seem obvious that all firms regardless of the type of product
market competition they face would pursue tax avoidance goals with a similar vigor in
order to improve cash flow, this study expects that the pressure to manage impressions
might compete with this goal. Coppens and Peek (2005) find that firms which present
higher income numbers are forced into reporting higher taxes when such firms are in
countries with high enforcement. Simply put, the authors find that there is some mutual
exclusivity between upward earnings management for perception purposes and
downward earnings management for tax purposes. This exists in part due to the various
natures of earnings management including real earnings management, i.e., the
manipulation of real sales and production cost and investment expense activities to
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present higher income levels. Such manipulations of operating fundamentals (e.g., timing
of revenue or discounts used to spur sales to meet a target) are unlike accrual based
earnings management, which can be considered more cosmetic (Roychowdhury 2006).
Thus, as some of the tools firms used to upwardly manage impressions affect real firm
sales and expenses, they will have a negative impact on cash tax savings from tax
avoidance. Even though the reporting of these higher numbers comes at the cost of less
tax avoidance, firms engage in this behavior regardless of this fact in some cases.
Firms engage in this practice because reported numbers are used to judge the
investment worthiness of a firm, and reductions in presented income could drive potential
investors elsewhere—thereby costing a firm far more than it might have gained from
taking part in cash flow increasing tax avoidance. Das and Zhang (2003) documents
extreme circumstances in which missing earnings targets by even a slight amount resulted
in tremendously negative views in the capital market. The reality is that firms are often
torn between the cash flow maximizing behavior (tax avoidance) and boosting
perceptions—at least when firms are domiciled in environments with strong enforcement
agencies that make reporting two totally different sets of books difficult.
The first hypothesis deals with the impacts of product market competition from
existing rivals on tax avoidance behavior. In line with Li (2010), this study believes that
firms will be less concerned with posturing when faced by existing rivals. This finding
was expanded upon buy Callahan et al. (2013) who find that firms under product market
pressure from existing rivals were less likely to engage in real earnings management, i.e.,
they are found to be unwilling to change firm operations just to show strong financial
performance reports. They are more concerned with solid business operations.
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In line with Callahan et al. (2013) and Li (2010), this study believes firms faced
with the threat of product market competition from existing rivals will be focusing on
business fundamentals, and keeping a strong cash flow is one such fundamental.
Therefore, the study predicts that firms facing immediate competition will be focused on
the cash flow maximizing behavior of tax avoidance. Thus, it lead to following
hypothesis:
H1: Product market competition from existing rivals leads to more tax avoidance.

The second hypothesis deals with the impact of product market competition from
potential entrants on tax avoidance behavior. Unlike product market competition from
existing rivals, product market competition from potential entrants pose a less immediate
threat to a firm. Therefore, firms under this type of competitive influence will feel less
pressure to take immediate steps (such as tax avoidance) to increase cash flow. While it is
intuitive that some marginal relationships for certain proxies for tax avoidance might be
found (these firms might utilize a mixed strategy), these potentially competition-facing
firms find themselves in more comfortable positions. Product market competition from
potential entrants does not comprise the immediate threat that product market
competition from existing rivals does. Thus, firms facing product market competition
from potential entrants can work more on managing market perceptions by manipulating
earnings in an upward direction, thereby seeking out investment capital with a strong
financial picture because of window dressing effect. Thus, it leads to following
hypothesis:
H2: Product market competition from potential entrants leads to more tax avoidance.
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This study also analyzes the impact of firm level product market competition on
tax avoidance. Nickell et al. (1992) and Nickell (1996) suggest that firms with greater
market shares in an industry typically face lower competition, as higher market share
indicates greater market power. This study examines whether or not market-leading firms
are more or less likely to avoid taxes. Politicians and regulators spend a great deal of time
focusing on said large firms, and they readily blame them for avoiding taxes through the
use of both legal and illegal schemes. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) discuss the
sensitivity firms have to political pressures in the context of their Positive Accounting
Theory. They put forth a political cost hypothesis which states that firms will tend to
manage earnings by using different accounting choices and procedures in such a manner
that the firm does not attract the attention of politicians and governments.
This study defines market leadership as either firms with 40% of the market share
in an industry, or the largest firm in an industry. This allows the researcher to test the
truthfulness of the anecdotes presented above.
Following the reasoning used in prior hypotheses, this study would expect that
market leading firms would be more concerned with presenting strong financial reports
than engaging in tax avoidance. The study must also consider the fact that based on the
wanted and unwanted attention shown to market leaders, impression management is
perhaps an even greater issue in firm level product market competition. The world pays
the most attention to the largest of firms, so the management of reputation can be
extraordinarily important. To keep up a strong earnings impression, and avoid the
unwanted scrutiny faced by firms such as Apple when their tax avoidance schemes came
to light, large firms may be forced to use far less tax avoidance than their smaller peers.
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An additional factor to consider when dealing with large market leaders is the
correlation that exists between the size of a firm and said firm’s tax avoidance behavior.
For example, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) suggest that larger firms benefit
from economies of scale when dealing with tax avoidance. This belief is in line with the
anecdotes put forth in the media that larger firms are more likely to take advantage of the
system.
Due to this conflict in both anecdotes and literature, this study cannot specifically
hypothesize the direction of the relationship between product market competition and tax
avoidance behavior. Based on the above discussion, it leads to following hypothesis:
H3: Industry market leader status has no effect on corporate tax avoidance behavior.

III. Research Design
Data and Sample
This study draws sample from all firm-year observations in the Compustat
America database, with sample period spanning the years 1991 through 2012. First, all
incomplete observations are filtered out. Then, the study also excludes firm-year
observations in which there is a negative pre-tax income. Tax avoidance motivations are
likely to be a low priority if a firm is suffering losses, and thus tax avoidance behavior (if
any) is difficult to model (Collins 1998; Klassen and Laplante 2012). This results in a
sample of 22,739 firm years representing 2,839 unique firms and 349 industries over a
period of 1991 through 2011.
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Measures of Tax Avoidance
Accounting literature has developed a large of number of accepted proxies for
corporate tax avoidance behavior (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Follow McGuire et al.
(2012), this study utilizes four commonly used proxies: book effective rate, cash effective
rate, tax-book differences, and discretionary permanent book-tax differences. As the
study discusses in this section, these four proxies each measure a somewhat different type
of tax avoidance behavior (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).
The first measure discussed is the book effective tax rate (ETR). The proxy for
book effective tax rate measures tax avoidance activities that directly influence net
income. It is perhaps the most commonly used and well established method for
demonstrating tax avoidance in accounting literature (e.g. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew
2010; Robinson et al. 2010). That said, it is a fairly straightforward approach that ignores
activities such as cash deferred taxes that are paid to a later period. This weakness will be
dealt with by the second proxy. The ETR is calculated by dividing total tax expense by
pre-tax book income less special items. A lower value for the ETR variable indicates
higher tax avoidance behavior.
The second measure discussed in this section is the cash effective tax rate
(CASHETR). Unlike the ETR, it factors in the cash flow aspect of tax avoidance.
According to Dyreng et al. (2008), managers often treat tax avoidance as a practice of
minimizing cash taxes paid. Beyond this intuitive cash-flow based reasoning, the
CASHETR also recognizes strategies that involve deferred cash taxes, even when they do
not affect the current period financial statements. The CASHETR is calculated by
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dividing cash taxes paid by pretax book income less special items. A lower value for the
CASHETR variable indicates more tax avoidance behavior.
The third tax avoidance measure is the total book-tax difference (BTD). The BTD
reflects activities which create permanent and temporary differences between financial
statement and book income. According to prior research (e.g. Wilson 2009) a larger BTD
represents more tax sheltering behavior as well as a higher probability of a firm receiving
audit adjustments from the IRS. BTD is calculated by taking the difference between tax
and financial statement income. Higher values in the BTD variable indicate higher levels
of tax avoidance.
The final tax avoidance measure is the discretionary permanent book-tax
differences (DTAX). As this measure indicates permanent differences between book and
tax incomes it is considered to be representative of highly aggressive tax avoidance
(Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; McGuire et al., 2012). DTAX is the residual of a
regression of permanent book-tax differences on non-tax planning items, state tax
expense, change in net operating loss, and minority interest. Higher values in the DTAX
indicate higher levels of tax avoidance.
Measures of Product Market Competition
Unlike the diverse and long-lived stream of literature in tax avoidance, product
market competition has only recently entered into the field of accounting. Thus, the
measures for product market competition are drawn from recent developments in
accounting literature (Callahan et al., 2013; Karuna, 2007; Li, 2010). Karuna creates
accounting variable based proxies for industry PP&E, product market size, and price-cost
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margin. Li builds upon Karuna’s framework and created a nine variable structure
organized into three factors. This structure is seen below:
A. Proxies for competition from potential entrants
a. Industry-average size of property, plant and equipment
b. Industry-average R&D expense
c. Industry-average capital expenditures
d. Industry Product Market Size
B. Proxies for competition from existing rivals
a. Herfindahl-Hirchman Index
b. Four-firm concentration ratio
c. Total number of firms operating in an industry
C. Proxies for industry profitability
a. Industry return on assets
b. Price-cost margin
Callahan et al. (2013) modifies the approach to calculating the measures of
product market competition by running a separating factor analysis. This factoring
approach enhances the coverage of original variables and avoids lower Eigenvalues in
factor analysis. A brief discussion of the eight product market variables drawn from
Callahan et al. (2013) and Li (2010) which are used in this study is found below.
The first dimension of product market competition represents competition from
potential entrants (PMC_F). The variables which measure this construct represent
barriers to market entry. The first variable in this category is industry property, plant, and
equipment (IND-PPE), which is measured by the weighted average of property, plant,
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and equipment of all firms in an industry. It is weighted by a firm’s market share. The
second variable in this category is industry research and development (IND-R&D), which
is measured by the weighted average of research and development of all firms in an
industry. It is weighted by a firm’s market share. The third variable in the potential
entrants’ category is industry capital expenditures (IND-CPX). IND-CPX represents the
weighted average of capital expenditures of all firms in an industry, and is weighted by a
firm’s market share. The final variable in the potential entrants category is industry
product market size (IND MKTS). IND-MKTS is likely to be negatively associated with
potential competition. It is measured as the natural log of aggregate industry sales. This
study aggregates the above discussed four variables into one factor representing product
market competition from potential entrants, and a high value in this factor represents high
product market competition from potential entrants (i.e., high initial investment barriers
results in less fear of potential rivals entering the industry).
The second dimension of product market competition represents product market
competition from existing rivals (PMC_C). The three variables in this factor represent the
competition faced by firms as represented by the number and density of rivals in an
industry. The first variable in this category is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (INDHHI), which is measured as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in an industry.
The second variable is the industry concentration ratio (IND-CON4), which is measured
by taking the sum of market shares of the largest four firms in an industry. The final
variable in the second dimension of product market competition is the industry number
variable (IND-NUM). IIND-NUM is simply the total number of firms in the industry.
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Following Callahan et al. (2013), this study aggregates the above discussed three
variables into one factor representing product market competition from existing rivals,
and a high value in this factor represents higher product market competition from existing
rivals (i.e., industries with many competitors are considered more competitive).
Finally, as established by prior product market competition literature, industry
profitability must be controlled for. In prior literature, there are two component for
industry profitability. The first component of the final factor is the industry average
return on assets (IND-ROA), which is measured as the pre-depreciation aggregate
operating profit of the industry divided by the aggregate total assets of the industry. The
second and final component of the third factor is the price-cost margin (IND-MGN),
which is measured as the aggregate sales in the industry divided by the aggregate
operating costs of the industry. However, instead of factor analysis, this paper uses the
industry average return on assets to control for industry profitability, following Chapter 2
and Chapter 3, because of only two components of industry profitability.
Measures of Market Power
The third independent variable of interest is market power (MKPWR). Nickell et
al. (1992) and Nickell (1996) suggest that firms with greater market shares in an industry
typically face lower competition, as higher market share indicates greater market power.
Therefore, this study measures firms’ market power in two different ways. The first
definition defines firms as having market power if they are the largest firm in an industry.
In the second definition firms are defined as having “market power” if they have 40%
control of an industry. Both of the measures for the market power construct represent

99

dominant firms that face little product market competition but extraordinary public
scrutiny over tax avoidance behavior.
Multivariate Models
To examine the association between tax avoidance and product market
competition both from potential entrants and from existing rivals, this study estimates the
following regression model:

𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑀𝐶_𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖

(13)

Where TAXAVOIDit is four proxies for Tax Avoidance for firm i’s at year t. It con: ETR,
CASHETR, BTD, and DTAX. ETR (Effective Tax Rate) is calculated by taking a firm’s
total tax expense and dividing it by their pre-tax book income. ETRs with negative
denominators are deleted. CASHETR (Cash Effective Tax Rate) is calculated by taking a
firm’s cash taxes paid and dividing it by pre-tax book income less special items.
CASHETRs with negative denominators are deleted. BTD (Book-to-Tax Difference) is
calculated by taking pre-tax income and subtracting estimated taxable income (scaled by
total assets at the beginning of the year). Pre-tax book income is obtained by taking
pretax income less minority interest. The estimate of Taxable income is obtained by
taking the sum of current federal tax expense and foreign tax expense, then dividing that
total by the top U.S. tax rate less that change in Net Operating Loss Carry forwards. If
current federal tax expense or foreign tax expense are missing, tax expense is defined as
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the difference between total tax expense and the sum of deferred tax expense, state tax
expense, and other tax expense. DTAX(Discretionary permanent book-Tax differences)
is the residual of a regression of permanent book-tax differences on non-tax planning
items state tax expense, change in net operating loss, and minority interest. It is
calculated following Frank et al. (2009). PMC_Cit is firm i’s product market competition
from existing rivals at year t. A factor composed of proxies for product market
competition from existing rivals, PMC_Fit firm i’s product market competition from
potential entrants at year t, IND_ROAit firm i’s Industry Profitability (industry average
return on assets), Firm Sizeit firm i’s the natural log of the market value of equity at the
beginning of the year t, and ABACCit firm i’s abnormal accruals for year t, based on the
modified Jones Model. NOLit firm i’s Net Operating Loss at year t, a dummy variable
equal to one if there is a tax loss carryforward, ΔNOLit firm i’s change in NOL,
calculated by subtracting the prior year NOL from the current year NOL (scaled by total
assets), R&Dit firm i’s research and development expense, calculated as R&D expense
scaled by total assets, LEVit firm i’s leverage, calculated as long term debt divided by
long term assets scaled by total assets, BTMit firm i’s Book-To-Market ratio, calculated
as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, PPEit firm i’s Property
Plant and Equipment, calculated as Net Property Plant and Equipment scaled by total
assets, ROAit firm i’s Return On Assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items
divided by average total assets, and CASHit firm i’s end of year cash holdings at year t,
calculated as cash scaled by total assets.
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To investigate effect of product market competition from existing rivals and from
potential entrants on corporate tax avoidance, this study uses Model (1) and analyzes the
two estimated coefficients of product market competition from potential entrants and
from existing rivals. In addition to the variables of interest discussed above, this study
also controls for other factors that prior research has found to be associated with tax
avoidance: abnormal accruals (ABACC) firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), capital
intensity (PPE), research and development activities (R&D), growth opportunities
(BTM), return on assets (ROA), cash holdings (CASH), and net operating loss carry
forwards (NOL as well as ΔNOL). Model (1) is run for each combination of four
different tax avoidance variable and two types of product market competition with all
control variables.

𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑃𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖

(14)

Where MKTPWRit is firm i’s Market Power. It is defined as either the largest
firm in an industry or 40% of control in an industry. Next the two specifications of
MKTPWR variable are tested to determine the tax avoidance behavior of the largest
firms that are most frequently targeted by regulators. Model (2) is run for each
combination of tax avoidance and market power, and all control variables are defined in
the same manner as Model (1).
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To investigate effect of firms’ industry competitive status on tax avoidance, this
study analyzes the two coefficient of market power variables. MKTPWR variables are
defined as either the largest firm in an industry or a firm holding a 40% share of an
industry. This test is firm level product market competition on corporate tax reporting
behavior through tax avoidance

IV. Empirical results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 19 presents descriptive statistics: mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum for each variable. The mean values in three out of four of tax avoidance
proxies represent that, on average, firms are not engaging in tax avoidance behavior
because of positive values in ETR and Cash ETR as well as the negative value in BTD.
On the other hand, the positive value in DTAX indicates more tax avoidance behavior
and implies that firms are most willing to keep permanent book tax differences. This may
be due to that fact that permanent differences in book and tax incomes allow firms to both
report high financial statement income and low taxable income simultaneously, while the
other metrics may imply a tradeoff in this regard. The mean (standard deviation) of main
product market competition variables is much closed to new product market competition
variables. It indicates that factor analysis with managers’ perception does not change
proxies of product market competition. Also, two different measurement of market power
have similar descriptive statistics.
Table 20 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among selected variables
used in the study. Among four different tax avoidance proxies, the correlation are all
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positively significant. Because of their measurement structure, correlation between ETR
(CashETR) and BTD (DTAX) should be negative. It indicates that each tax avoidance
proxy provides a different scope of corporate tax reporting behavior so that four different
tax avoidance proxies should be applied. On the univariate level, this study finds almost
no meaningful relationship between product market competition and four measures of tax
avoidance. All tax avoidance proxies have a negative correlation with product market
competition from existing rivals. Also, ETR, CashETR, and BTD have a negative
correlation with product market competition from potential entrants. Due to different
measurement structure, correlation of ETR and CashETR should have opposing
correlations of BTD and DTAX. Therefore, there is no meaningful relationship in
correlation analysis and this study moves to the multivariate tests to test hypotheses.
Multivariate Regressions
Table 21 presents the results of regression of tax avoidance on both dimensions of
product market competition in order to investigate the effect of product market
competition on tax avoidance behavior. In terms of product market competition from
existing rivals, product market competition has significant association with tax
avoidance. While product market competition from existing rivals has significantly
negative association with ETR and CashETR, product market competition from existing
rivals has significantly positive association with BTD and DTAX. Models with ETR and
CashETR have highly significant and negative estimated coefficients at p-value < 0.0001,
suggesting that high product market competition from existing rivals leads to more tax
avoidance. Furthermore, models with BTD and DTAX have highly significant and
positive coefficients at p-value < 0.0001, indicating that high product market competition
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from existing rivals leads to more tax avoidance. Thus, these significant coefficients of
product market competition from existing rivals implies that increased product market
competition from existing rivals pushes firms to engage in more tax avoidance behavior.
In terms of product market competition from potential entrants, product market
competition has clear direction but significant association with tax avoidance. While
product market competition from potential entrants has negative association with ETR
and CashETR, product market competition from potential entrants has positive
association with BTD and DTAX. However, an estimated coefficient of CashETR is only
significant at p-value < 0.01. Although estimated coefficients of ETR, BTD, and DTAX
are insignificant, all effects of product market competition from potential entrants are the
same as among the four different tax avoidance proxies. Therefore, all coefficients
indicate that product market competition from potential entrants is associated with more
cash based tax avoidance behavior. In sum, the analysis for Table 21 indicates that while
product market competition from existing rivals presses firms into greater levels of tax
avoidance in order to bolster cash flows, product market competition from potential
entrants less presses firm into greater levels of tax avoidance due to immediate threat of
competition from potential entrants.
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Table 22 reports a result of regression of four proxies for tax avoidance on firms’
product market competitive status to investigate firm level product market competition
analysis. This study defines MKPWR1 as those firms that are the largest in their
respective industries. The estimated coefficient of MKPWR1 has consistent results
among models with four different tax avoidance proxies; ETR and CashETR have a
positive association, and BTD and DTAX have a negative association. Especially, tax
avoidance by BTD, and DTAX (CashETR) have significant negative (positive)
coefficients at p-value < 0.001. In each case, the coefficient indicates that the more
dominant the firm the less likely it is to avoid taxes when compared to its smaller peers.
Furthermore this study has another proxy, MKPWR2, defining firms with market
power as those firms with 40% or more of their industry for firm level analysis. Contrary
to MKPWR1, MKPWR2 can consider firms’ influential status to industry. Regression
results with MKPWR2 represent very consistent and strong coefficients. While ETR and
CashETR have significant positive association with MKPWR2 at p-value < 0.05 and
0.0001, respectively, BTD and DTAX have significant negative association at p-value <
0.001 and 0.0001, respectively. This is consistent with the findings from prior definition
of market power (MKPWR1). Thus, Table 22 supports the assertion that larger and
industry leading firms actually avoid taxes at a lower rate than their smaller and industry
following firms.

V. Robustness Test
In this section, this study reports the results of sensitivity analyses. Table 23
re-estimates the results of Table 3 by utilizing Li’s (2010) product market competition
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measurement. Li introduces three classifications to measure product market competition.
She derives three factors by using principle component analysis. The new approach
results in the following variables: New PMC_F, New PMC_C, and New IND_ROA.
Consistent with the findings in Table 21, Table 23 displays a negative coefficient
for New PMC_C with ETR and CashETR as the dependent variable at p-value < 0.0001.
With BTD and DTAX as the dependent variable, New PMC_C has a positive coefficient
at p-value < 0.0001. As noted earlier, negative coefficients for the first two dependent
variables indicate more tax avoidance, while positive coefficients indicate increased tax
avoidance for the latter two. Table 23 supports the assertion that product market
competition from existing rivals pushes firms to engage in tax avoidance behavior.
In terms of product market competition from potential entrants, the coefficients on
New PMC_F for all four measures of tax avoidance are consistent with Table 21.
Whereas coefficients with ETR and CashETR have a negative association, coefficients
with BTD and DTAX have a positive association. The coefficient for CashETR is
negatively significant at p-value < 0.01. Although only the coefficient for CashETR is
significant and coefficient for ETR is close to marginally significant, all coefficients of
New PMC_F are consistent. These results closely mirror those found in Table 21. Thus,
the revised factor analysis’ results support the general assertion that product market
competition from potential entrants does not drive tax avoidance behavior. In summation,
this study finds that the previously reported results in Table 21 (original factor analysis)
are robust under these new specifications (new factor analysis).
Following Chapter 2, this study also adopts new product market competition
measurement. Li et al. (2013) provide new product market competition measurement by
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counting the number of words, such as “Competition, Competitive, Competitor, and so
on”, in firm’s 10-K. This new measurement represents managers’ perception of the firm’s
product market competition and status. As in Chapter 2, this study uses the new product
market competition measurement (PCTCOMP) by inserting it as another control variable
and adding it into the factor analysis. Table 24 shows regression of tax avoidance on
main factors of product market competition and managers’ perception as a control
variable. Consistent with Table 21, product market competition from existing rivals has
consistently highly significant association with tax avoidance. Whereas coefficients with
ETR and CashETR are negative associated, coefficients with BTD and DTAX have a
positive association. For product market competition from potential entrants, the
coefficient for ETR is only positively significant, suggesting that firms in low product
market competition from potential entrants engage in more tax avoidance and confirms
the window dressing effect. Table 25 represents regression of tax avoidance on new
factor analysis with managers’ perception in factor analysis. Consistent with Table 21,
product market competition from existing rivals has consistently high significant
association with tax avoidance. Whereas coefficients with ETR and CashETR are
negatively significant at p-value < 0.01, coefficients with BTD and DTAX are positively
significant at p-value < 0.05 and 0.0001, respectively. For product market competition
from potential entrants, the coefficient for ETR is only positively significant, which
confirms the presence of the window dressing effect. In summation, these sensitivity tests
confirm the main findings of this study and that the main results of this study are robust.
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VI. Conclusion
This study examines whether industry product market competition on corporate
tax reporting behavior. Specifically, the study investigate the effect by two types of
product market competition both from potential entrants and from existing rivals and by
four different corporate tax avoidance. Also, the study investigates effect of firm’s
industry competitive status on tax avoidance in firm level product market competition.
This study finds that firms facing intense product market competition from
existing rivals are more likely to engage in tax avoidance behavior than firms facing
competition from potential entrants. Specifically, firms in high product market
competition from existing rivals increase tax avoidance whereas firms in high product
market competition from potential entrants do not increase tax avoidance, except for cash
based tax avoidance. The association between cash based tax avoidance and product
market competition from potential entrants is different from the association with other
type of tax avoidance. Moreover, the study tests the anecdotal claims that the largest and
most dominant firms are the most prolific users of tax avoidance and find the claim to be
false. This study finds that market leader firms are less likely to engage in tax avoidance
behavior than smaller firms and market following firms.
The study contributes to prior literature by being the first paper to study the
impacts of product market competition on tax avoidance. This study is the first to test the
influence of different types of industry level product market competition on tax
avoidance behavior. Product market competition is one of determinant of corporate tax
avoidance reporting behavior. Next, the study finds the effect of firm level product
market competition on tax avoidance behavior. This topic is a highly relevant issue for
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U.S. regulators as the United States is both high in competition and corporate tax rates. If
small firms dealing with intense product market competition from existing rivals are most
likely to avoid taxes, perhaps a less complex tax code would allow regulators to target
these firms rather than focusing on the largest firms due to time constraints.
This paper is a response to calls for tax and regulatory reform in America. The
results support the claim that a competitive environment encourages a high degree of tax
avoidance, and this tax avoidance is being carried out by those firms that are least likely
to be targeted by regulators. That is, smaller and market following firms in high product
market competition industry are likely to engage in tax avoidance behavior. Of course,
these firms are simply responding rationally to the immediate threat of competition by
avoiding taxation to increase their cash flows in an effort to outperform their existing
rivals. Because the U.S. product market is highly competitive, this problem will result in
sustained revenue loss unless tax laws are changed. Regulators must also work to enforce
tax laws on all firms, with a focus on the smaller and industry following firms that evade
the media spotlight and avoid taxes at a higher rate than their larger and industry leading
firms. For the tax enforcement purpose, a targeting a few larger and industry leading
firms is much easier and more affordable. However the regulator should enforce tax
reform and system equally to all firms regresses of size and industry competitive status.
This study defines corporate tax avoidance broadly as all activities for the
reduction of explicit taxes. However, one stream of tax literature states that tax evasion
(illegal and aggressive behavior) is different from tax avoidance (legal activity and Gray
behavior). In future research, this study can be move to effect of types of product market
competition on tax evasion or Gray behavior separately.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Product markets are becoming increasingly more competitive as economic
borders fade. Because of a higher number of firms in U.S. product market, increasing
globalization, and more FTAs (Free Trade Agreements), both product market competition
from potential entrants and existing rivals is growing. According to the Economic
Census, the number of firms is steadily increasing in the U.S. product market. Because of
globalization and Free Trade Agreements, the number of foreign firms which operate in
U.S. is also steadily increasing. Therefore, firms are more likely affected by competitive
condition of product market. This dissertation examines the effect of product market
competition on firms’ financial reporting quality.
The first dissertation paper examines product market competition from potential
entrants and existing rivals on earnings quality. This study uses 13,236 firm-years
observations during the period 1993 to 2011 to examine whether product market
competition (PMC) affects earnings quality. Specifically, theory suggests that firms in
intense competition may engage in real earnings management or accrual based earnings
management. However, the differential direction of the effect of each type of product
market competition is obscure and the sparse empirical literature is mixed. Relying on
previous literature, this study seeks to improve methodology and proxy construction. The
results indicate that product market competition from potential entrants and existing
rivals decreases real earnings management and partially decreases accrual based earnings
management. Product market competition from potential entrants and existing rivals
deceases production cost and discretionary expense real earnings management, whereas
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product market competition from potential entrants decreases accrual based earnings
management. This result confirms the discipline role of product market competition on
managerial operating decision and financial reporting quality.
The second dissertation paper investigates how types of product market
competition affect Classification Shifting of Earnings management. In prior literature,
McVay (2006) and Barua et al. (2010) find that firms shift operating expenses to special
items and income-decreasing discontinued operations in order to increase core earnings.
This paper finds that firms in high product market competition have consistent core
earnings level and managers in high product market competition are less likely to use
classification shifting earnings management through special items. Furthermore, firms in
high product market competition are less unexpected core earnings and are less likely to
use special items for classification shifting earnings management than firms in low
product market competition. However, this paper finds a drawback of research design for
classification shifting earnings management, suggested by McVay (2006). This research
design provides inconsistent results between unexpected core earnings and unexpected
change in core earnings and with and without controlling for other risks.
The third dissertation paper examines the impact of product market competition
from existing rivals and from potential entrants on corporate tax avoidance behavior in
the United States. Results from the empirical analyses reveal that tax avoidance behavior
is positively associated with product market competition from existing rivals. In contrast,
firms facing product market competition from potential entrants appear to be less
concerned with avoiding taxes. Next, this paper examines whether firms’ competitive
standing on product market affect corporate tax avoidance behavior. This firm level
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analysis finds that market leader firms and larger market share firms engage in less tax
avoidance. While U.S. congressmen (e.g. Levin and McCain 2013) target large and
visible firms like Apple, this study finds that it is actually smaller firms under
competitive product market pressure that take advantage of the tax system.
This dissertation adds to the existing body of literature by examining the effect of
growing product market competition on three different earnings managements and
corporate tax reporting behavior. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature by
suggesting better methodology for measuring product market competition from potential
entrants and from existing rivals by factor analysis. In future research, this dissertation
could be connected to direct and indirect association among the three different types of
earnings managements (real earnings management, accrual based earnings management,
and classification shifting earrings management) and investigate determinants and
outcomes of their choice among the three types of earnings management. Also, it could
lead to better methodology for examining classification shifting earnings management.
Last, this dissertation will be connected to capital market consequence of growing
product market competition and firms’ different type of voluntary disclosure policy in
future research.
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